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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past forty years, students in the U.S. have experienced 
increasingly strict school discipline policies and increased police 
presence in schools. The proportion of U.S. schools patrolled by police 
increased from about 1 percent in 1975 to nearly 50 percent in 2017.1 
Legislators and policy makers have sent police, often called “school 
resource officers” (SROs), into schools to improve security in the wake 
of mass shootings. But research has repeatedly shown that this policy 
has not produced the desired effect: There is limited evidence that such 
programs increase school safety,2 and the regular presence of law 
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 1. AM. C.L. UNION, Cops and No Counselors: How the Lack of School Mental Health Staff 
Is Harming Students 4, 8 (2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/030419-
acluschooldisciplinereport.pdf [hereinafter Cops and No Counselors]. 
 2.  See John Woodrow Cox & Steven Rich, Scarred by School Shootings: More Than 
187,000 Students Have Been Exposed to Gun Violence at School Since Columbine, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/us-school-shootings-
history/ (describing a study finding that, between 1999 and 2018, out of 197 gunfire incidents at 
school, there was one instance where a school resource officer stopped an active shooter by 
returning fire); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., Effects of School Resource Officers on School Crime 
and Responses to School Crime, 19 CRIMINOLOGY PUB. POL’Y 905, 931 (2020) (finding that there 
is no empirical support for the popular belief that deployment of SROs “will prevent mass 
shootings from occurring”). See also CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: 
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enforcement in schools negatively impacts students in a myriad of 
ways,3 including by causing physical and emotional harm and worse 
educational outcomes (e.g., contributing to the “school-to-prison 
pipeline”).4 These injuries are borne disproportionately by students of 
color and disabled students.5 
Proponents of SROs often emphasize SROs’ additional roles as 
counselors, educators, and mentors. As the Executive Director of the 
National Association of School Resource Officers explained, “[w]ell-
trained school resource officers operate more like counselors and 
educators, . . . working with students to defuse peer conflict and address 
issues such as drug and alcohol use.”6 In response to calls to reallocate 
SRO funding to programs that support students’ mental, social, and 
emotional well-being, one police department emphasized that SROs 
serve as “an ear that will listen, a coach, a mentor, an educator, a trusted 
adult, a counselor, a service provider, a facilitator of resources. . . . The 
 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 6–12 (2018), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180705_R45251_db5492370a04c7e3b39f27ce52416d229a
0ac17d.pdf (summarizing data from various studies on the efficacy and impact of SROs). 
 3.  See, e.g., Emily K. Weisburst, Patrolling Public Schools: The Impact of Funding for 
School Police on Student Discipline and Long-Term Education Outcomes, 38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 338, 362 (2019) (“On the whole, the results suggest that SROs have the potential to 
negatively affect students, through both increasing student discipline involvement and reducing 
student educational attainment.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Jennifer Counts et al., School Resource Officers in Public Schools: A National 
Review, 41 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 405, 426 (2018) (citation omitted) (“Greater numbers 
of school arrests for school behavior/conduct violations, rather than criminal activity, have 
exposed students to adjudication through the school-to-prison pipeline.”); Gottfredson et al., 
supra note 2, at 909 (describing studies “support[ing] the conclusion that SROs, by increasing 
exclusionary responses to school discipline incidents, increase the criminalization of school 
discipline and in so doing contribute to a ‘school to prison pipeline,’ which disproportionately 
affects minority youth and students with disabilities and increases the likelihood that minority 
youth will end up in prison”). 
 5.  See Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (citation omitted) (“Particularly impacted by these 
practices are at-risk groups who are already disproportionately affected in exclusionary discipline 
(e.g. special education and minority students).”). There is disagreement over using “person-first” 
language, i.e., a person with a disability, or “identity-first” language, i.e., a disabled person. This 
note will primarily use identity-first language because it is the language that many disabled people 
prefer. See, e.g., Emily Ladau, Why Person-First Language Doesn’t Always Put the Person First, 
THINK INCLUSIVE (July 20, 2015) https://www.thinkinclusive.us/why-person-first-language-
doesnt-always-put-the-person-first/ (describing the debate, its origins, and conventions around 
usage). In some instances, this note will alternate or use person-first language when, for example, 
that is the language used in a statute. In addition, a precise definition of disability is not needed 
for this note. However, the Note’s use of the term will mostly align with statutory definitions of 
disability that are relevant in school settings. 
 6.  Dana Goldstein, Do Police Officers Make Schools Safer or More Dangerous?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/us/schools-police-resource-
officers.html (quoted language from article paraphrasing original statement of the Executive 
Director of the National Association of School Resource Officers). 
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law enforcement aspect of being an SRO is very minimal.”7 
Ultimately, though, even if SROs assume the role of counselor and 
educator, they retain the immense power and privileges of sworn law 
enforcement officers. They are exempt from many restrictions that 
apply to teachers, school administrators, and counselors, but are 
equipped with handcuffs, tasers, and other methods of control. 
Meanwhile, most schools in the U.S. have far fewer school counselors, 
social workers, nurses, and psychologists than recommended,8 and 
millions of students are educated in schools with police present but no 
counselor, nurse, psychologist, or social worker.9 “Conflating the law 
enforcement purpose of school police with ‘educators’, ‘counselors’ and 
‘social workers’ is both misleading and dangerous,” in part because it 
“justifies the under-investment in funding, hiring and training of social 
and emotional supports for students to fulfill these roles.”10 
Despite years of work by advocates to prevent the physical, 
emotional, and social injuries caused by SROs, these harms continue to 
occur. And aside from the most extreme situations, the Constitution 
and federal law are inadequate both for preventing SROs from using 
inappropriate force and for providing relief when harm has already 
occurred. In any event, claims against SROs rely heavily on federal 
law.11 While there is extensive research and legal scholarship about 
SROs and related issues, there is minimal legal scholarship on areas 
where state constitutions and state law may offer additional 
mechanisms for advocates working to protect students with disabilities 
 
 7.  Jimmy Bentley, Ban Police Officers from MA Schools: Teachers Union, PATCH 
(Jun 22, 2020), https://patch.com/massachusetts/barnstable-hyannis/ma-teachers-association-
calls-end-police-presence-schools (reporting on statement saying, “Districts must change how 
they meet the emotional health and safety needs of students and identify and obtain the necessary 
resources to keep students, educators and communities safe”). 
 8.  Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at 4–5 (explaining that 90% of public schools fail 
to meet professional recommendations). 
 9.  Id. at 4 (“14 million students are in schools with police but no counselor, nurse, 
psychologist, or social worker. 1.7 million students are in schools with police but no counselors; 3 
million students are in schools with police but no nurses; 6 million students are in schools with 
police but no school psychologists; and 10 million students are in schools with police but no social 
workers.”). 
 10.  Fail: School Policing in Massachusetts, CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST. & STRATEGIES FOR 
YOUTH 17 (2020), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ea378e414fb5fae5ba06c7/t/5f64b57d40e1a14ef6c1c468/16
00435601167/SchoolSafetyPolicyReport.pdf [hereinafter School Policing in Mass. Report]. 
 11.  See Perry A. Zirkel, An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law Arising from the Use of 
School Resource Officers, 48 J.L. & EDUC. 305, 317 (2019) (finding that approximately 70% of 
student-specific claim rulings in SRO-related cases were based on federal constitutional or 
legislative claims). 
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from inappropriate actions by SROs.12 
States often have the authority and latitude to impose more robust 
protections,13 especially in the arenas of education and law 
enforcement, which are traditionally areas of state and local control.14 
Yet state constitutional provisions, laws, and regulations—and courts’ 
interpretations of those requirements—tend to mirror federal analogs 
in a phenomenon called “lockstepping” or “judicial federalism.”15 This 
Note examines whether there are state law mechanisms that are more 
protective of disabled students than federal laws, and whether such laws 
provide an additional avenue either for relief after harm has occurred 
or to prevent such harms altogether. However, even where state 
provisions may provide relief, broader harm prevention will require 
comprehensive federal and state policy reform. States and localities 
can—and should—implement reforms and treat federal law as a floor 
rather than as a ceiling, and state courts should avoid reflexive 
lockstepping when interpreting state provisions. 
This Note begins by describing the role of SROs and presenting 
research on their efficacy and impact. Part II describes litigation trends, 
limits on SRO actions under federal law, and the potential for broader 
use of state law for curtailing inappropriate SRO conduct. Part III 
canvasses SRO, school discipline, and disability discrimination laws in 
Massachusetts and analyzes potential claims under select provisions in 
comparison to federal law to provide a roadmap for such legal analysis. 
Part IV draws on perspectives from advocates at non-profit litigation 
and policy organizations to describe key areas for reform and 
conclusions regarding potential legal strategies that may be available 
 
 12.  Prior research and scholarship have examined, among many other topics, the types of 
federal claims available to students after incidents with SROs and the impacts of SROs and zero-
tolerance discipline on educational and other outcomes. Many organizations have also prepared 
compendiums of state laws and requirements related to use of corporal punishment, restraint and 
seclusion, and SRO training requirements. 
 13.  See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A 
Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1313 (2017) (“Many state constitutions also have provisions 
that mandate government provision of social services, such as education and welfare, and state 
courts have held that these provisions confer positive rights that the Supreme Court has refused 
to recognize under the Federal Constitution.”). 
 14.  RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
2 (8th ed. 2016) (“[M]ost public services that affect people in their homes and families—public 
schools, policing . . ., public safety. . .—are provided by states and localities, not the federal 
government.”). 
 15.  Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
323, 325 (2011). Lockstepping is typically used to describe constitutional law, but this Note will 
apply the concept to include statutes and regulations. 
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under state law. 
I.  THE RISE OF SROS AND PUNITIVE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTS 
School resource officers (SROs) are sworn law enforcement 
officers with arrest authority that are assigned to work in one or more 
schools.16 They are usually employed by a local law enforcement agency, 
like a county or city police department.17 SROs are distinct from 
security guards who lack arrest authority.18 The purpose of SROs is 
usually to “ensure the safety and security of students, faculty, staff, and 
visitors.”19 The membership organization for SROs developed the 
“triad model,” in which the SRO’s role includes duties as a law 
enforcement officer, an informal counselor, and a teacher.20 But in 
reality, studies show that SROs spend most of their time on law 
enforcement activities.21 
This section will first describe the SRO role, drivers behind the 
increased prevalence of SROs, and the relationship between SRO 
presence and stricter discipline practices generally. Second, this section 
will summarize data on the impacts of SROs. 
A.  SROs and “zero tolerance” discipline policies 
Use of SROs grew significantly beginning in the 1990s and early 
2000s, coinciding with highly publicized school shootings and the 
passage of federal legislation funding SRO programs.22 The growth was 
 
 16.  CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, supra note 2, at 2. 
 17.  Id. In some cities, the school district has its own school police department that is separate 
from the city police department or sheriff’s office. Id. (“The difference between SROs and school 
police officers is that the latter are employed by a school police department (e.g., the Los Angeles 
School Police Department) and not a city police department or sheriff’s office.”). For the 
purposes of this Note, the term SRO will generally include school police officers. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Mo Canady et al., To Protect and Educate: The School Resource Officer and the 
Prevention of Violence in Schools, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS 21 (2012), 
https://www.nasro.org/clientuploads/resources/NASRO-Protect-and-Educate.pdf. See also 
CONG. RES. SERV. R45251, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]hese officers are more than armed sentries 
waiting to engage a shooter. . . [T]heir roles can be placed into three general categories: (1) safety 
expert and law enforcer, (2) problem solver and liaison to community resources, and (3) 
educator.”). 
 21.  Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader: Interactions 
Between School Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 229, 235–36 
(2017) (collecting studies on SRO roles) (“[T]he law enforcement aspect of the triad model seems 
to be predominant in the everyday work of SROs.”). 
 22.  See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 341 (“Political interest in school police escalated after 
the high-profile Columbine school shooting in 1999.”). See also Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing 
Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 222 (2018) 
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largely driven by hopes that the presence of SROs would keep students 
safe. In 1999, the DOJ created the “COPS in Schools” grant program to 
support law enforcement in schools.23 Political support and federal and 
state funding for SROs has fluctuated since the 1990s,24 but on the 
whole, federal, state, and local governments tend to increase funding 
for SROs after mass school shootings.25 For example, after the 2018 
shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida, states spent millions on security upgrades and SROs.26 In 
conjunction with adding SROs, schools across the U.S. have adopted 
increasingly strict disciplinary policies.27 Federal funding has 
incentivized schools to adopt “zero tolerance” policies for offenses 
related to weapons and drugs, and states and school districts have 
expanded the scope of zero tolerance policies to apply to an array of 
less serious conduct.28 
Despite the federal incentives for states to use SROs, there are no 
federal training or supervision requirements, and training and 
qualification requirements vary widely across states.29 As of 2016, fewer 
than half of all states had statutes or regulations that set minimum 
qualifications for SROs, and only a few states described the training 
 
(describing legislation that promoted the use of SROs, including the Violent Crime and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act). 
 23.  Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 233.  
 24.  See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 342 (describing fluctuating appropriations and attitudes 
from the Bush administration to present); Gottfredson et al., supra note 2, at 908 (“As federal 
funding for SROs has become less certain, state level funding has increased.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Department of Justice Awards Hiring Grants for Law Enforcement and School 
Safety Officers, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-
justice-awards-hiring-grants-law-enforcement-and-school-safety-officers (reporting an allocation 
of $45 million to the COPS program to fund 356 new SRO positions following the mass shooting 
at Sandy Hook Elementary School).  
 26.  Carolyn Phenicie, The State of School Security Spending: Here’s How States Have 
Poured $900 Million into Student Safety Since the Parkland Shooting, THE 74 (August 20, 2018), 
https://www.the74million.org/article/the-state-of-school-security-spending-heres-how-states-
have-poured-900-million-into-student-safety-since-the-parkland-shooting/ (“The amounts 
ranged widely by state, from $300,000 in Missouri to $400 million in Florida. They include only 
what’s being spent [in 2018], though some states allocated a larger amount over a few years.”). 
 27.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 222–23. 
 28.  Id. at 223. See also Weisburst, supra note 3, at 341 n.6 (explaining that zero-tolerance 
policies are “laws or school policies that require predetermined consequences for specific student 
offenses, without considering mitigating circumstances or context”). 
 29.  Counts et al., supra note 4, at 412 (“Although SROs are one of the fastest growing 
branches of policing, there are no federal guidelines outlining the procedures for training 
SROs.”); Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 236–42 (describing National Association of School 
Resource Officer training courses, state training statutes and regulations, and SRO training on 
mental health and issues affecting students with disabilities).  
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SROs should receive.30 Some state statutes include precatory language 
or discretionary requirements for SRO training on youth mental and 
behavioral health issues and interacting with disabled students.31 
Increasingly, states and localities have imposed limits on SRO 
discretion32 and have suggested or required that school districts create 
written memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the local law 
enforcement agency supplying SROs to delineate SROs’ duties and 
decision-making authority.33 
B.  The Impacts of SROs 
There is minimal evidence to suggest that SROs improve school 
safety.34 To the contrary, research shows that SROs have a largely 
negative impact on students, inflicting physical and emotional harm, 
increasing students’ interactions with the criminal justice system for 
minor misbehavior, diminishing students’ experience of a positive, safe 
school environment, and inhibiting educational attainment and 
outcomes.35 Studies have found that increased reliance on surveillance 
and unreasonable searches and seizures may create, among other 
things, “an environment of fear and distrust, reduce perceived 
 
 30.  See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 238 (“Twenty-three states and the District of 
Columbia have state statutes or regulations that require SROs to be trained or certified. However, 
most states do not specify curriculum or training guidelines, although some state administrative 
agencies or organizations may be responsible for developing training material or curricula.”). 
 31.  Id. at 240. 
 32.  Gottfredson et al., supra note 2, at 907 (describing concerns that have been raised about 
SROs and that “many school districts have recently begun to place limits on SRO discretion”). 
 33.  See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 243 n.107 (collecting state MOU statutes). See 
also OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
FACT SHEET 1, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (2017), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/MOU_Fact_Sheet.pdf (“Every jurisdiction with 
a school and law enforcement partnership should have an MOU that clearly defines the roles and 
responsibilities of the individual partners involved, including school districts, boards or 
departments of education, school administration officials, law enforcement agencies (including 
SROs), students, and parents.”). For an extensive collection and comparison of state SRO and 
discipline laws and regulations, see Compendium of School Discipline Laws and Regulations for 
the 50 States, Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Territories, NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE SUPPORTIVE 
LEARNING ENV’TS, https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/school-discipline-compendium (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
 34.  See, e.g., Gottfredson et al. supra note 2, at 908–13, 929–31 (providing a literature review 
of research on SROs, noting that there is no empirical support for the popular belief that 
deployment of SROs prevents mass shootings, and finding that increased SRO presence does not 
reduce school crime).  
 35.  Weisburst, supra note 3, at 339–41 (providing a literature review of research on the 
impact of SROs and discipline measures and analyzing data from Texas schools). See also School 
Policing in Mass. Report, supra note 10, at 14 (noting a study which found that “being stopped at 
school by police officers was a ‘potent’ predictor of heightened emotional distress and 
posttraumatic stress symptoms in youth.”). 
HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  6:44 PM 
194 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
legitimacy of police, weaken the school’s sense of community, and 
diminish students’ willingness to confide in school staff when they are 
experiencing problems.”36 As one judge noted, the use of handcuffs can 
disrupt a child’s education “far beyond the time they actually spend in 
handcuffs” by causing children to have negative feelings about school, 
stigmatizing and alienating them, and making them not want to 
attend.37 Other studies have identified similar findings and have linked 
federal grants for SROs to both an increase in discipline rates and a 
decrease in high school graduation rates.38 
With more SROs in schools, there has also been a dramatic increase 
in escalating interactions between SROs and students. Arrests by SROs 
and other police officers called to schools are overwhelmingly for 
minor misbehavior39 “once considered to be under the purview of 
school administrative discipline.”40 Common student behaviors can 
result in serious, disproportionate criminal charges: for instance, fake 
burping resulted in criminal charges for “disrupting school”; refusing 
to leave the lunchroom and cursing led to charges of disorderly 
conduct; throwing a paper airplane and a baby carrot led to assault 
charges; and the temper tantrum of a five year-old with ADHD was 
met with charges for battery of a police officer.41 
As trained law enforcement officers, SROs tend to use “justice 
system responses” to address student misbehavior when the behavior 
could be addressed without escalating to such extremes.42 In a case 
involving an SRO in the Fourth Circuit, Chief Judge Roger Gregory 
described the harms from this kind of school policing: “Unnecessarily 
handcuffing and criminally punishing young schoolchildren is 
undoubtedly humiliating, scarring, and emotionally damaging. We must 
be mindful of the long-lasting impact such actions have on these 
 
 36.  Gottfredson et al. supra note 2, at 928. 
 37.  E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 38.  See Weisburst, supra note 3, at 339–41 (providing an extensive literature review of 
research on the impacts of SROs and original quantitative research). But see Gottfredson et al., 
supra note 2, at 929 (noting that the increased school disciplinary offenses in their study are 
“probably due at least in part to increased surveillance”). 
 39.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 224–25. 
 40.  Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (“Increases in the number of school arrests for 
behaviors that were once considered to be under the purview of school administrative discipline 
have amplified the likelihood that students will experience exclusionary discipline 
consequences.”). 
 41.  Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at app. D tbl.A7 (citing various news articles 
describing incidents).  
 42.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 252. 
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children and their ability to flourish and lead prosperous lives . . . .”43 
Students with disabilities and students of color experience the 
negative impacts of such responses most acutely. Many of the SRO and 
student interactions that escalate involve disabled students and often 
occur in connection with behavior related to the student’s disability. 
Indeed, students with disabilities are nearly three times more likely to 
be arrested than their nondisabled counterparts, and in some states, 
arrest was ten times more likely.44 While there is minimal data 
specifically on arrests of disabled students by SROs, “there are an 
increasing number of reported cases where students with disabilities 
have been handcuffed or arrested by SROs.”45 Disabled students 
account for 16 percent of the U.S. student population,46 but nearly 80 
percent of students subjected to restraint or seclusion (by SROs and 
other school personnel) were disabled students.47 More broadly, 
disabled students are disciplined more than their non-disabled peers, 
including with restraints, suspensions, expulsions, arrests, and referrals 
to the criminal justice system.48 
Cumulatively, the presence of SROs denies students the 
 
 43.  E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 188 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[O]fficers should not 
handcuff young students who may have committed minor offenses but do not pose an immediate 
threat to safety and will not evade arrest.”). 
 44.  Cops and No Counselors, supra note 1, at 5 (summarizing data collected by the 
Department of Education and other sources, and finding that “Black and Latino boys with 
disabilities were 3 percent of students but were 12 percent of school arrests”). 
 45.  Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 248 (citation omitted). 
 46.  U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. FOR C.R., 2017-2018 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: THE 
USE OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN K-12 SCHOOLS, 2 
(2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/restraint-and-seclusion.pdf (including 
students served under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504)). 
 47.  Id. at 6–7. Students who are Black and disabled were subjected to particularly 
disproportionate rates of restraint and seclusion. See id. at 10–11 (reporting that students who are 
Black account for 18 percent of students served under the IDEA, yet account for 26 percent of 
disabled students subjected to physical restraint; 34 percent of disabled students subjected to 
mechanical restraint; and 22 percent of disabled students subjected to seclusion). But see U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-20-345, K-12 EDUCATION NEEDS TO ADDRESS 
SIGNIFICANT QUALITY ISSUES WITH ITS RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION DATA 1, (April 2020) 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/706269.pdf (stating that restraint and seclusion data is almost 
certainly underinclusive). 
 48.  Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 247. See Counts et al., supra note 4, at 426 (cleaned 
up) (“Greater numbers of school arrests for school behavior/conduct violations, rather than 
criminal activity, have exposed students to adjudication through the school-to-prison pipeline. 
This is despite the lack of research demonstrating the efficacy of exclusionary discipline practices, 
zero tolerance policies, and adjudication of student behaviors for improving school safety. 
Particularly impacted by these practices are at-risk groups who are already disproportionately 
affected in exclusionary discipline (e.g., special education and minority students).”).  
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opportunity to learn.49 These SRO interactions and negative outcomes 
fall disproportionately on students with disabilities and students of 
color, adding to the already staggering educational and societal barriers 
that these students face. 
II.  LEGAL STRATEGIES TO OBTAIN RELIEF FOR INJURIES FROM 
SROS HAVE FALLEN SHORT 
With increasing presence of SROs in schools, students have sought 
relief in the courts, albeit with minimal success.50 Lawsuits brought in 
response to SRO actions generally raise federal constitutional and 
statutory claims against school districts, police departments, and 
individual police officers. Students often sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,51 
claiming they have been subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment or to a Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process violation.52 Disabled students also bring suits 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),53 Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504),54 and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).55 Students’ claims typically fall into 
two categories—education-based claims related to the IDEA, and 
arrest-based claims related to the ADA and Section 504. In some cases, 
students raise violations of state tort laws, state anti-discrimination 
statutes, or state constitutional law as well.56 
Federal law imposes some limits on SROs, but rulings on federal 
claims largely favor law enforcement, the school district, or other 
 
 49.  See generally We Came to Learn: A Call to Action for Police-Free Schools, 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & ALL. FOR EDUC. JUST. (2018), https://advancementproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/WCTLweb/index.html#page=1 (describing the impacts of exclusionary policies).  
 50.  See Zirkel, supra note 11, at 314–22 (providing an overview of a study finding that most 
federal claim rulings in cases involving SROs were resolved in favor of the government authority); 
Wolf, supra note 22, at 219 (concluding that “students’ potential civil rights remedies against 
abuses by SROs are quite limited because of the considerable leeway provided to SROs in their 
interactions with students by existing student rights jurisprudence”). 
 51.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. . . .”). 
 52.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 240. 
 53.  42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 54.  29 U.S.C. § 794. 
 55.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. 
 56.  Zirkel, supra note 11, at 317 tbl.2. 
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government authority.57 A 2019 study found that just six percent of 
federal claim rulings came down in favor of the individual student, 
while the rest were in favor of the government authority (75 percent), 
or were inconclusive (19 percent).58 Even so, litigants rely heavily on 
federal law: Among final decisions on the merits in cases involving 
students and SROs, nearly 70 percent of the claims ruled upon were 
based on a federal law, including the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA.59 
This section will describe limits on SROs under some of the most 
frequently litigated federal laws and highlight some of the reasons that 
outcomes for federal claims typically favor government authorities. In 
light of broad reliance on federal law claims in SRO-related litigation 
and the poor outcomes for individual students, this section will then 
consider the practice of states interpreting their constitutions in 
lockstep with the U.S. Constitution and the potential for broader 
protections under state law. 
A.  Federal limits on SRO actions under the Fourth Amendment and 
disability discrimination statutes 
1.  Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment 
Students in SRO-related cases often bring claims for wrongful 
seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.60 
SRO-related Fourth Amendment claims are typically raised under 42 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See id. (providing separate totals for claims under federal statutes and the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments). Inconclusive rulings included denials of pretrial motions, e.g., 
dismissal or summary judgment; government authorities included school districts, the city or 
county employing an SRO, or the state. Id. at 314. The study identified 229 student-specific 
rulings: 157 were on federal claims. Id. at 317. Student-specific claim rulings included civil cases 
where a student was the plaintiff and criminal cases where the student was the defendant and 
excluded rulings where the SRO or another non-student was the plaintiff, e.g., another school 
employee or the parents separate from the student. Id. at 316. 
 59.  Id. at 317 (finding that of student-specific claim rulings, approximately 40% were based 
on the Fourth Amendment; 13% on the Fifth Amendment; 11% on the Fourteenth Amendment; 
7% on federal legislation; 15% on state torts; 18% on criminal codes; and only .9% (two claim 
rulings) on state constitutions). 
 60.  Id. at 318. The presence of SROs in schools also frequently raises issues related to 
protection against unreasonable searches, in part because of blurred lines between the SRO’s role 
as a member of law enforcement and as school personnel. Issues related to this blurring of roles 
are also relevant to seizure analysis. See generally Peter Price, When is a Police Officer an Officer 
of the Law: The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541 (2009) 
(evaluating the evidentiary standards that courts apply in cases involving SROs, considering 
challenges with and confusion on the role of police in schools, and advocating for a bright line 
rule that treats SROs as police officers at all times). 
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U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private right of action to individuals 
when a public official “acting under color of state law” violates a 
codified legal right.61 The case law in this area tends to favor law 
enforcement and other government authorities, making it difficult for 
students injured by SROs to succeed in court.62 
These outcomes largely demonstrate the nearly impenetrable veil 
of qualified immunity.63 Qualified immunity shields state and local 
governments and officials from the burdens of suit altogether, and, by 
extension, from paying civil damages.64 Traditionally, courts have 
justified qualified immunity based on “the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”65 Qualified immunity has evolved into a potent defense 
for law enforcement in many settings, but it has proven a particularly 
powerful roadblock in SRO cases because of the relative newness of 
widespread use of SROs. 
Qualified immunity applies unless a court concludes that the 
government or official violated “clearly established law.” To succeed 
on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) a right was violated, 
and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the 
official’s actions such that the official would have sufficient notice that 
their actions would violate the right.66 Courts “define the ‘clearly 
 
 61.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (The “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue 
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 
law, is action taken under color of state law.”) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 
(1941)). A state official acting under a “badge of authority” can be liable even if their actions 
violated restrictions on that authority. Id. at 171–72 (“ . . . Congress has the power to enforce 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State 
and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse 
it.”). Requirements for municipal liability differ from those for state liability. Municipalities are 
immune from liability unless the plaintiff can establish that the official was acting under an official 
policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local government 
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it 
is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 
 62.  See Wolf, supra note 22, at 219 (noting that students’ federal civil rights remedies against 
SROs are “quite limited” because of the qualified immunity defense and “because applicable laws 
and school rules are particularly controlling of student behavior, SROs can more readily justify 
their more aggressive and antagonistic interactions with students”). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (noting that “qualified immunity 
protects government officials from liability for civil damages” and is “an immunity from suit 
rather than a mere defense to liability”) (cleaned up). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 202 (2001) (establishing a two-part test for 
qualified immunity and holding that “[i]f the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct 
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established’ right at issue on the basis of the ‘specific context of the 
case,’” and earlier precedents must closely resemble the fact patterns 
and claims of the current litigation.67 If the right was clearly established 
at the time of the alleged violation, the official is likely not entitled to 
qualified immunity.68 However, courts frequently decide § 1983 cases 
without addressing whether the conduct violated the law because they 
have discretion to determine the order for addressing each prong of the 
two-prong test.69 This makes it nearly impossible for rights to become 
clearly established in the first place. In the SRO context, it is 
particularly difficult for law to become clearly established because 
“existing case law [about SROs] is inconsistent and favorable to SROs’ 
ability to search students based on minimal information and use force 
against students even if they seemingly do not pose a real threat.”70 
The Fourth Amendment use of force standard also gives law 
enforcement significant latitude and deference: Courts have recognized 
a need for officers to make split-second decisions under exigent 
circumstances.71 There are two different tests that courts apply in the 
school setting to evaluate the objective reasonableness of seizures and 
use of force: the test from New Jersey v. T. L. O.,72 and the “Graham 
factors” from Graham v. Connor.73 The T. L. O. test is two-fold: The 
 
would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate”). 
 67.  Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). 
But see Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Even in the 
absence of factually similar case law, an official can have fair warning that his conduct is 
unconstitutional when the constitutional violation is obvious, sometimes referred to as ‘obvious 
clarity’ cases.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (“[Q]ualified immunity protects government 
officials . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (cleaned up)). 
 69.  See id. at 236 (modifying the two-part test from Saucier and holding that lower courts 
“should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the 
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular 
case at hand.”). Put another way, by allowing courts to first determine if “the right that was 
allegedly violated was clearly established,” courts can avoid determining “if a right was in fact 
violated in the case at hand.” Wolf, supra note 22, at 239. 
 70.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 254–55. See also generally Kevin P. Brady, School Resource 
Officers and the Unsettled Legal Standard for Establishing Student Excessive Force Claims, 359 
EDUC. L. REP. 689 (2018) (describing why the law on SROs is unclear and providing an overview 
of key Supreme Court cases and varied state laws on SROs). 
 71.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (“The calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount 
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”).  
 72.  See 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (“[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend 
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”). 
 73.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96 (considering “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
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court considers whether the search was “justified at its inception” and 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”74 The Graham factors evaluate the 
severity of the crime, the immediacy of any safety threats to officers or 
others, and whether the individual is “actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest.”75 Courts can also consider other factors,76 
and in SRO-related cases, those factors may include the school setting 
and the relative threat in light of the student’s age.77 But generally, 
“students’ youth (and their diminished physical prowess) do not seem 
to restrict SRO’s ability to use force when arresting students for even 
the most minor misbehavior.”78 As described above, establishing that 
an SRO violated a Fourth Amendment right is often not enough to 
prevail because the law governing SROs is so unsettled. Taken together, 
the strength of the qualified immunity defense and the unsettled state 
of law governing SROs mean that recovery is rare.79 
2.  Disability discrimination statutes: The ADA, Section 504, and 
the IDEA 
Public school students with disabilities are protected primarily by 
three laws: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),80 
 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”). Circuits are divided on which standard 
to apply, and some courts apply both. See, e.g., K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Sch., 931 F.3d 813, 822 
(8th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases and summarizing the split “on whether to apply T.L.O.’s 
reasonableness standard or the objective reasonableness standard set forth in Graham . . .  to law 
enforcement seizures of students” and noting that “[s]ome courts have opted to apply both . . . in 
analyzing a claim of unreasonable seizure and excessive force”) (citations omitted). 
 74.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
 75.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96. 
 76.  See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (noting that analysis of 
objective reasonableness is highly fact specific and providing non-exclusive examples illustrating 
the types of “objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force”). 
 77.  See, e.g., E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting, in a case 
where an SRO handcuffed a calm, compliant ten-year-old, that “we believe it prudent to consider 
also the suspect’s age and the school context”); S.R. v. Kenton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 302 F. Supp. 
3d 821, 833 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (considering the nature of plaintiffs’ conduct, which “[did] not call to 
mind the type of ‘assault’ which would warrant criminal prosecution,” the lack of immediate 
threat posed by the children given their respective ages and statures, and the method of 
handcuffing). 
 78.  Wolf, supra note 22, at 219, 254. 
 79.  See, e.g., E.W., 884 F.3d at 186–87 (concluding that an SRO’s seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment under the Graham factors, but holding that the SRO was entitled to qualified 
immunity because it was not clearly established that handcuffing a non-threatening child could 
violate the Fourth Amendment); S.R., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 834–35 (applying both Graham and 
T.L.O. and concluding that the SRO violated the Fourth Amendment, but dismissing the claim 
because the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity). 
 80.  42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504),81 and the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).82 With SROs’ 
ubiquitous presence in schools, it is almost certain that they will interact 
with students who are eligible for protections under the ADA, Section 
504, or the IDEA, making all three laws pertinent to the issues 
involving SROs. The ADA and Section 504 are broadly applicable civil 
rights laws intended to ensure that disabled individuals have equal 
access to and participation in society, and they include requirements 
that apply to law enforcement and to schools and education.83 The 
IDEA is narrower, imposing requirements on states, local education 
agencies, and schools that relate specifically to the administration of 
schools and education services.84 
Under their combined and overlapping requirements, the three 
laws impose obligations to ensure that disabled individuals have an 
equal opportunity to succeed, including by facilitating access and 
ensuring that disabled individuals are not denied benefits or services 
on the basis of their disability.85 In some instances, the requirements 
under these laws entail affirmative obligations: such as providing 
reasonable accommodations, modifications, or supplemental aids or 
services.86 The affirmative obligations imposed by the ADA, Section 
 
 81.  29 U.S.C. § 794. 
 82.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.; see generally Disability Rights in Public Primary and Secondary 
Education: How Do They Relate?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (2018), 
https://adata.org/factsheet/disability-rights-laws-public-primary-and-secondary-education-how-
do-they-relate [hereinafter ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison] (summarizing and comparing the 
three laws) (“Under IDEA, the child must have a specific disability (as defined in law) and must 
need specially designed instruction and related services. A child can have a disability and be 
covered under 504 and ADA (non-discrimination), but not require specially designed instruction 
and thus not receive services under IDEA.”).  
 83.  See ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82; Commonly Asked Questions 
about the Americans with Disabilities Act and Law Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIV., 
DISABILITY RTS. SECTION (Revised Feb. 25, 2020) [hereinafter The ADA and Law Enforcement], 
www.ada.gov/q&a_law.htm (“Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with 
disabilities in State and local governments services, programs, and employment. Law enforcement 
agencies are covered . . . The ADA affects virtually everything that officers and deputies do . . .”). 
 84.  See ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82. 
 85.  See id.; The ADA and Law Enforcement, supra note 83. 
 86.  The IDEA does not explicitly require accommodations or modifications, but they may 
be required to fulfill the statutory requirement to provide a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (a)(4). The implementing 
regulations for Title II of the ADA require, inter alia, that public entities “make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability” unless the modification would be a fundamental alteration. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). 
The implementing regulations of Section 504 require, inter alia, that disabled individuals are 
provided with certain “supplementary aids and services.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a). The terms 
“accommodation” and “modification” will be used interchangeably in this Note. 
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504, and the IDEA are defining and unique features. 
As law enforcement, SROs are generally held to different standards 
than school personnel under federal, state, and local requirements 
related to conduct, training, and supervision.87 Thus, the applicability of 
these three laws to SRO interactions with students is unsettled. 
Disability-based claims can be broadly categorized as: (1) arrest- or 
force-based, often involving reasonable accommodation claims under 
the ADA and Section 504, and (2) education-based, often involving 
denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least 
restrictive environment as required by the IDEA. Barriers to successful 
claims under these statutes include fulfilling the exhaustion provision 
of the IDEA,88 demonstrating a link between the student’s disability 
and the SRO’s action, and meeting the standard for intent.89 
a.  The ADA and Section 504 
Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination by state and 
local government entities, including public schools.90 Title II states that 
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits 
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected 
to discrimination by any such entity.”91 Section 504 similarly prohibits 
disability discrimination against individuals in programs that receive 
federal funding, which includes most public schools.92 The ADA and 
Section 504 target discrimination that Congress had perceived “to be 
most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of 
thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”93 Central to the 
 
 87.  For example, law enforcement must typically have probable cause to conduct a search, 
while school personnel acting alone only need reasonable suspicion. See generally New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (“[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren 
with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable 
cause. . .”).  
 88.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). For a full discussion of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, see 
generally Chris Ricigliano, Note, Exhausted and Confused: How Fry Complicated Obtaining 
Relief for Disabled Students, 16 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 34 (2021).  
 89.  Zirkel, supra note 11, at 321–22.  
 90.  42 U.S.C. § 12132.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (an individual with disabilities cannot, “solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any 
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency”). 
 93.  Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985). The Supreme Court decided Choate 
before the enactment of the ADA. “When Congress enacted the ADA a few years after Choate, 
HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  6:44 PM 
2021] SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS 203 
ADA and Section 504, entities have an affirmative duty to prevent 
disability-based discrimination and to provide reasonable 
accommodations.94 
To state a claim for discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a 
plaintiff must show that: 
(1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise 
qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of a public entity’s 
services, programs or activities; (3) she was either excluded from 
participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, 
programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by the 
public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 
discrimination was by reason of her disability.95 
The ADA and Section 504 define disability as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”96 
Arrest- or force-based claims involving law enforcement are 
typically brought for failure to provide reasonable accommodations, 
failure-to-train, or for wrongful arrest in violation of the ADA and 
Section 504.97 While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, 
 
it incorporated the disparate-impact interpretation into Title II: ‘It is . . . the Committee’s intent 
that section 202 [ADA Title II] . . . be interpreted consistent with Alexander v. Choate.’” Mark C. 
Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1417, 
1442 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol56/iss4/4 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, 
pt. 2, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 367).  
 94.  See, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A plain 
reading of the ADA evidences that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on public 
entities to create policies or procedures to prevent discrimination based on disability.”); Pierce v. 
District of Columbia, 128 F. Supp. 3d 250, 269 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[N]othing in the disability 
discrimination statutes even remotely suggests that covered entities have the option of being 
passive in their approach to disabled individuals as far as the provision of accommodations is 
concerned. Quite to the contrary, . . . Section 504 and Title II mandate that entities act 
affirmatively to evaluate the programs and services they offer and to ensure that people with 
disabilities will have meaningful access to those services.”). 
 95.  E.g., Sheehan v. City of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014) rev’d in part 
on other grounds, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted in part, and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1765 
(2015). The standard to prove a prima facie case of discrimination is mostly the same under 
Section 504 and Title II. 
 96.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B).  
 97.  See Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (“Courts have recognized at least two types of Title II 
claims applicable to arrests: (1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a 
disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2) 
reasonable accommodation, where . . . [police] fail to reasonably accommodate the person’s 
disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or 
indignity in that process than other arrestees.”); Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 
2018) aff’g in part, vacating in part and remanding sub nom. Haberle for Est. of Nixon v. Borough 
of Nazareth, 5:15-CV-02804, 2018 WL 4770682 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2018), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Haberle v. Borough of Nazareth, 936 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that a general failure 
to train police officers or institute policies does not violate Title II, but a failure to train that was 
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most circuits have held that Title II of the ADA applies to law 
enforcement during arrests and investigations, thus requiring that 
police provide, among other things, reasonable accommodations to 
disabled individuals.98 DOJ guidance also interprets Title II to apply 
during arrests.99 In the school setting, plaintiffs may allege that the 
municipality and SRO violated the ADA by, for example, failing to 
modify “policies, practices, or procedures,” “failing to ensure policies, 
practices, procedures, training, or supervision that take the needs of 
children with disabilities into account,” or by maintaining “methods of 
administration that have the effect of discriminating against persons 
with disabilities.”100 
A party can succeed on a Title II or Section 504 claim for injunctive 
or declaratory relief even in the absence of discriminatory intent.101 To 
recover damages, courts require proof of intent,102 although a party can 
generally establish intent by proving deliberate indifference.103 For 
example, in a case in Flint, Michigan, an SRO handcuffed a disabled 
seven-year-old in response to non-threatening disability-related 
misbehavior,104 the court found that the SRO did not need to have 
specific knowledge of the child’s disability for a finding of 
discrimination under the ADA.105 Inferring intentional discrimination 
 
at issue during the incident may). 
 98.  See, e.g., Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231 (“Exigent circumstances inform the reasonableness 
analysis under the ADA, just as they inform the distinct reasonableness analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment.”). In circuits where the court has not explicitly addressed the question, lower courts 
tend to find that Title II does apply during arrests. See, e.g., Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178 (concluding 
that “the answer is generally yes” on the question of whether Title II applies during arrests); see 
also Morais v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.06-582, 2007 WL 853811, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 
2007) (“The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the application the 
ADA or [Rehabilitation Act] to police activities and procedures, but a majority of courts now 
hold that the ADA applies to arrests and similar police action in some circumstances.”).  
 99.  See, e.g., The ADA and Law Enforcement, supra note 83 (stating that the ADA affects 
“arresting, booking, and holding suspects”). 
 100.  E.g., McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, *15 (E.D. 
Mich. Apr. 12, 2019). 
 101.  See, e.g., McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 n.8 (11th Cir. 
2014) (“Where a plaintiff is not seeking compensatory damages, discriminatory intent is not 
required.”) 
 102.  See, e.g., Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1108 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Our circuit 
requires proof of intentional discrimination before a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages 
under section 504, and we have suggested that as much is required under Title II.” (cleaned up)). 
 103.  See, e.g., McCullum, 768 F.3d at 1146–47 (“[A] plaintiff must show that a defendant 
violated his rights under the statutes and did so with discriminatory intent. A plaintiff may prove 
discriminatory intent by showing that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to his statutory 
rights.” (cleaned up)).  
 104.  McCadden, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, at *2. 
 105.  Id. at *20–21 (“[I]ntentional discrimination may be inferred from a defendant’s 
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from the defendant-city’s deliberate indifference, the court explained 
that “the City knew or should have known about the elevated 
likelihood that any Flint juveniles would suffer from a disability and 
should have taken action to address how officers interact with Flint 
juveniles.”106 In addition, facially neutral policies that have 
discriminatory impact may also violate the ADA.107 
However, if there are exigent circumstances when an officer uses 
force, courts often find that accommodations were unreasonable.108 
Courts consider a variety of factors when evaluating exigent 
circumstances and the reasonableness of accommodations during 
arrest or investigations.109 In Wilson v. City of Southlake, for example, 
the Fifth Circuit considered the school setting, the SRO’s knowledge of 
the child’s disability, and the relative threat.110 The court concluded that 
the SRO was subject to the requirements of Title II because “[t]here 
was no potentially life-threatening situation or threat to human life.”111 
b.  The IDEA 
The IDEA requires that eligible students receive a free appropriate 
public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment 
appropriate to the individual’s needs.112 The IDEA includes a “child-
 
deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely 
result in a violation of federally protected rights.” (citing Velzen v. Grand Valley State Univ., 902 
F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046 (W.D. Mich. 2012)). 
 106.  Id. at *20 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim). 
 107.  See, e.g., McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have 
repeatedly recognized that facially neutral policies may violate the ADA when such policies 
unduly burden disabled persons, even when such policies are consistently enforced.”).  
 108.  Compare Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801–02 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that police 
are not subject to the requirements of Title II while there are exigent circumstances) with Gohier 
v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] broad rule categorically excluding arrests 
from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law.”).  
 109.  See Carly A. Myers, Note, Police Violence against People with Mental Disabilities: The 
Immutable Duty under the ADA to Reasonable Accommodate during Arrest, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1393, 1411 (2017) (explaining that, in incidents with people with mental illness, courts seem to 
consider the “nature and history of a person’s mental illness; the officer’s knowledge of the 
individual’s disability; the physical setting and conditions giving rise to the incident; and the 
presence, degree, and immediacy of danger to the person with a disability, the officers, or the 
general public”). 
 110.  936 F.3d 326, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 111.  Id. at 331. 
 112.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)–(5) (“A free appropriate public education is available to all 
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21. . .”). Children are 
eligible under the IDEA if they have a specific disability (as defined in the law) and require 
“special education and related services” because of that disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(a). Schools 
must develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP) describing the needs of and services 
for each eligible child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (defining requirements for IEPs). The IDEA also 
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find” provision that affirmatively requires schools to identify eligible 
students.113 The IDEA also imposes requirements regarding 
suspensions, expulsions, and management of disability-related behavior 
with the overarching aim of reducing the systematic exclusion of 
students with disabilities from education, especially when it results 
from behaviors that are a manifestation of their disability.114 If a 
student’s disability causes a behavior, the student cannot be suspended, 
expelled or otherwise disciplined for that behavior.115 Federal law does 
not explicitly prohibit the use of restraint and seclusion, but they may 
violate the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504 in some cases.116 
Education-based claims are typically brought against schools for a 
denial of FAPE stemming from an SRO-related incident or an SRO’s 
conduct.117 Student-plaintiffs generally claim that the SROs’ conduct 
violated the IDEA’s requirements related to discipline or 
suspensions.118 However, such claims generally fail, as courts typically 
do not hold SROs to the requirements of the IDEA in the same manner 
as other school personnel.119 
Applied in the school setting, the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA 
reflect policy aims and legislative presumptions that students “will be 
educated with children without disabilities and will be removed from 
the classroom or placed in special classes only when necessary to meet 
their individual needs,” and that they will “receive educational services 
in the regular educational environment with the appropriate aids and 
services necessary to ensure they benefit from educational 
opportunities.”120 Existing federal law does not adequately address how 
 
requires school to consult with parents or guardians and follow due process procedures. 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1414, 1415. 
 113.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(3), (a)(10)(A)(ii) (West 2020). 
 114.  See generally ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82. 
 115.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)–(F); see also Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at Section II 
(describing requirements under the IDEA and Department of Education guidance (issued in 
2016) related to behavioral interventions that are intended to address disabled students’ 
“undesired” disability-related behaviors); DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 1 (Aug. 
1, 2016) https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/dcl-on-pbis-in-ieps-08-01-2016.pdf (warning school districts 
that failure to provide adequate behavioral supports to students with disabilities could violate 
federal education law). 
 116.  2017-2018 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: THE USE OF RESTRAINT AND 
SECLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN K-12 SCHOOLS, supra note 46, at 4. 
 117.  See Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 259–265 (describing cases where SRO conduct 
contravened requirements in students’ IEP or behavior intervention plan). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  See id. (explaining that SROs are typically not bound by students’ IEPs and behavior 
intervention plans).  
 120.  ADA, 504, and IDEA Comparison, supra note 82. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (requiring 
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these aims can continue to be implemented and protected when SROs, 
not just school personnel, are regularly interacting with students in the 
school environment. 
B.  States have the power to guarantee positive rights and treat federal 
law as a “floor,” but many fall into lockstep with federal law, 
treating it as a ceiling 
Federal provisions have proven inadequate to protect disabled 
students from harm by SROs and to remedy that harm after it occurs. 
But states have the ability to implement additional protections that 
exceed the floor set by federal law. To limit the harm from SROs, states 
should adopt policies that exceed the floor set by federal law, and courts 
should avoid reflexive lockstepping when interpreting state provisions. 
State courts often interpret state constitutional provisions in 
lockstep with federal courts’ interpretations of the analog provision of 
the U.S. Constitution, even though such interpretations are not 
required.121 A “highly generalized guarantee,” such as a restriction on 
searches, need not mean the same thing to different sovereigns.122 
Nevertheless, “state courts have relied heavily—at times completely 
and explicitly—on federal constitutional doctrine when interpreting 
their own charters, even when the language, history, and intent of the 
latter are distinct.”123 
Among other names, scholars have referred to this concept as 
“judicial federalism,” “new judicial federalism,” and “lockstepping.”124 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton defined lockstepping as “the tendency of some 
state courts to diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in 
 
that programs are administered “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 
qualified individuals with disabilities”); 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (requiring programs to educate 
qualified “handicapped” people “with persons who are not handicapped to the maximum extent 
appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person”); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the 
maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are 
not disabled, and . . . removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when . . . education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids 
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”). 
 121.  See Blocher, supra note 15, at 325 (“[S]cholars, state courts, and even Supreme Court 
Justices have repeatedly noted that state constitutions need not be interpreted in line with the 
federal Constitution.”) (citations omitted). 
 122.  JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 174 (2018) (ebook) (“Why the meaning 
of a federal guarantee in these areas (or any other) proves the meaning of an independent state 
guarantee is rarely explained and often seems inexplicable.”). 
 123.  Blocher, supra note 15, at 325. 
 124.  This paper will primarily use the term “lockstepping” because it is the most intuitive and 
clear. Blocher notes that, while accurate, the term “is widely reviled by scholars of state 
constitutional law. See id. at 340.  
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reflexive imitation of the federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution.”125 State courts typically consider federal constitutional 
claims first, and then “summarily announce that the state provision 
means the same thing.”126 Sutton argues against lockstepping and 
contends that there are immense benefits when states try out a “new” 
idea before the country “takes on the risks associated with 
implementing it.”127 In addition, Professor Joseph Blocher argues that 
courts should give more weight to state constitutional doctrine in 
federal constitutional cases.128 
Multiple scholars cite the positive right to public education that 
many states confer as an example of an area of state constitutional law 
that is not in lockstep with the U.S. Constitution.129 Indeed, “every state 
constitution currently contains at least one constitutional provision 
regarding public education.”130 These provisions have generally been 
applied to school funding and resource allocation131 in conferring a 
positive right to education.132 After the Supreme Court “definitively 
rejected the idea that the U.S. Constitution contained the right to an 
education” in 1972, plaintiffs increasingly turned to state constitutional 
 
 125.  Sutton, supra note 122, at 174. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 177 (“There will never be a healthy ‘discourse’ between state and federal judges 
about the meaning of core guarantees in our American constitutions if the state judges merely 
take sides on the federal debates and federal authorities, as opposed to marshaling the distinct 
state texts and histories and drawing their own conclusions from them.”). 
 128.  Blocher, supra note 15, at 327–28 (noting that the Supreme Court has looked to state 
law for guidance in criminal procedure cases, due process cases, and Eighth Amendment cases).  
 129.  See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: 
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS ch. 5 (2013) (ebook) 
(describing state constitutional treatment of education as an example of a tradition of positive 
rights in the U.S.); SUTTON, supra note 122 (describing the state and federal “stories” of different 
illustrative rights, including public education); Blocher, supra note 15, at 333 (“Many [state 
constitutions] guarantee ‘positive’ rights—obligations on the government to provide public 
education, for example—which are unheard of in the federal system.” (cleaned up)); Liu, supra 
note 13, at 1313 (“Many state constitutions also have provisions that mandate government 
provision of social services, such as education and welfare, and state courts have held that these 
provisions confer positive rights that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize under the 
Federal Constitution.”).  
 130.  Zackin, supra note 129, at 67. 
 131.  See generally id. at ch. 5 (describing the historical context of state constitutional 
education provisions and the evolution of activism in response to state legislatures mismanaging 
school funds). 
 132.  Blocher, supra note 15, at 332–33. See generally Emily Parker, 50-State Review: 
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-
1.pdf (providing a 50-state overview of the constitutional foundation for public education in each 
state). 
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claims instead.133 A lack of recourse under the U.S. Constitution 
prompted “a new wave of textual education rights.”134 By 2007, the state 
high courts in all but seven states had considered the constitutionality 
of state systems of public school financing: Courts in twenty-six of those 
states held that the ways in which the state funded its school system 
was unconstitutional.135 
Litigants’ use of dual federal and state constitutional claims became 
a “widespread option” in the 1960s and 1970s after the Supreme Court 
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process clause.136 After incorporation and during the 
Warren Court era, “state constitutional law emerged as an independent 
legal force, but only where it exceeded the federal floor.”137 As the 
Supreme Court shifted right under the Burger Court, however, state 
constitutional law once again garnered more attention from advocates 
as “it was now possible that a state constitutional claim might succeed 
where its federal analogue would fail.”138 In a 1991 guide to 
Massachusetts civil rights laws, a civil rights attorney advocated for the 
use of state civil rights laws amid “federal judicial retrenchment,” 
writing that “state civil rights law offers promising new approaches to 
 
 133.  Zackin, supra note 129, at 98 (describing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973)). In response to Rodriguez and the “closure” of “the federal courts . . . to those who 
seek to overturn educational finance systems through the federal Equal Protection Clause,” 
education activists “challeng[ed] education financing on state constitutional grounds and in state 
courts.” Id. at 99.  
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 128 (citing Michael Paris, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE 
POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 46 (2010)); see also Alia Wong, The Students Suing for 
a Constitutional Right to Education, THE ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/lawsuit-constitutional-right-
education/576901/ (“[E]ducational equity is the most active area of litigation regarding state 
constitutions in [state] courts . . . Such suits have been brought in pretty much every state, more 
than half of which—60 percent—have resulted in a finding that there is a right to a high-quality 
education under the respective state constitution . . .”). 
 136.  Sutton, supra note 122, at 175. 
 137.  Blocher, supra note 15, at 336 (“[S]ince relatively few state courts were inclined to read 
rights more broadly than the Warren Court, the Federal Reporter effectively displaced state 
constitutions. . . [M]any state courts, knowing that federal rights were so expansive, tended to 
resolve cases on the basis of federal guarantees rather than state analogues. The result was an 
atrophying of state constitutional interpretation.”) 
 138.  Id. at 337. “[L]iberals urged state courts to ‘step into the breach’ left by the Burger 
Court’s ‘contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism.’” Id. at 337 (quoting 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986)). Justice Brennan’s 1977 
Harvard Law Review article, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” “in 
which he called on state courts to reclaim ground the Burger Court had allegedly given away” was 
the “Magna Carta” of the “movement.” Id. 
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the stubborn problems of discrimination.”139 
With ongoing harm from inappropriate conduct by SROs and limits 
on remedies under federal law, state constitutions and civil rights laws 
could again offer additional approaches. As Justice Goodwin Liu of the 
California Supreme Court emphasized, “state courts, as the ultimate 
arbiters of state law, have the prerogative and duty to interpret their 
state constitutions independently.”140 Advocates and policy makers 
should look to state provisions as part of a broad strategy to limit the 
harms from SROs and raise the floor set by federal law. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE-LEVEL SOLUTIONS AS A POTENTIAL 
SOURCE FOR REMEDIES FOR INAPPROPRIATE SRO CONDUCT 
SRO-related problems lend themselves to analysis under a 
lockstepping framework because, in the absence of adequate federal 
remedies, states have increasingly enacted legislation and regulations 
relating to SROs and school discipline. States have imposed limitations 
on the use of corporal punishment and restraint and seclusion and 
enacted requirements for SRO training and delineation of duties. 
States have also established best practices for school districts and law 
enforcement agencies, including requiring or recommending the use of 
MOUs.141 To evaluate the potential of state law remedies in the context 
of SROs, I started by identifying state laws and regulations that either 
mirror or exceed protections under the federal provisions upon which 
litigants often rely, including civil rights and equal protection laws and 
regulations, and SRO and school discipline laws and regulations.142 I 
then selected one state—Massachusetts—for in-depth research. 
Massachusetts has, at various points in time, been seen as providing 
more protections for people with disabilities than federal law,143 and it 
 
 139.  Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts Civil Rights Law, 76 MASS. L. REV. 77, 96 (1991) 
(“Massachusetts has the constitutional and statutory tools to redress the real economic and social 
harm, as well as the insult to human dignity, that results from invidious discrimination against any 
group.”). 
 140.  Liu, supra note 13, at 1315 (emphasis in original). 
 141.  See generally Zeke Perez Jr. and Ben Erwin, A Turning Point: School Resource Officers 
and State Policy, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES: EDNOTE (July 9, 2020), 
https://ednote.ecs.org/a-turning-point-school-resource-officers-and-state-policy/ (describing 
trends and collecting sources on different policies). 
 142.  This Note did not include analysis of state tort laws and criminal laws, or administrative 
exhaustion requirements. 
 143.  For example, Massachusetts was one of the first states to pass a law protecting the rights 
of disabled students in education, doing so before Congress enacted the IDEA. See generally Gary 
L. Monserud, The Quest for a Meaningful Mandate for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
18 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 675 (2004) (providing a detailed account of 
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is one of nine states that has received a rating of “meets requirements 
and purposes of IDEA” every year since 2014.144 
Nonetheless, while Massachusetts has instituted a number of 
reforms over the past decade, students in the state still experience a 
criminalized school environment: Massachusetts law requires at least 
one SRO per district, with some exceptions.145 And disabled students 
are disproportionately disciplined. During the 2018–2019 school year, 
36.4 percent of students disciplined for non-violent, non-drug, or non-
criminal offenses were disabled students, though they represent just 
19.2 percent of the student body.146 
Massachusetts’s constitution, laws, and regulations may offer viable 
avenues for challenging SROs’ inappropriate use of force and restraints 
on students with disabilities. But there is effectively no federal or state 
court precedent applying these provisions to incidents with SROs, 
making it difficult to determine if remedies are indeed available. In 
addition, analysis of Massachusetts laws and regulations reveals that 
claims against SROs for use of force may face numerous barriers to 
success: Some regulations may not apply to or be enforceable against 
 
Massachusetts’s special education mandate and the amendment to adopt the federal standard in 
2002, and suggesting that, in actuality, the pre-2002 standard was applied as a less rigorous 
“maximum feasible” standard, not “maximum possible”). Compare Stock v. Mass. Hosp. Sch., 
467 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Mass. 1984) (recognizing the more stringent state-law standard) and David 
D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 423 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court’s 
finding that “since Massachusetts law mandated a level of substantive benefits superior to that of 
the federal Act, the state standard would be utilized as determinative of what was an ‘appropriate’ 
education for the child”) with E.T. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Div. of Admin. L. 
Appeals, 91 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 n.1 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Massachusetts had previously adhered to the 
higher standard of ‘maximum possible development’ before adopting the federal standard of ‘free 
appropriate public education.’”). 
 144.  Based on the U.S. Department of Education determination letters for 2014 to 2020 
evaluating states’ implementation of the IDEA Part B. For simplicity, only the determination 
year, date of publication or revision, and the hyperlink are provided for determinations prior to 
2020. Off. of Special Educ. and Rehab. Servs., 2020 Determination Letters on State Implementation 
of IDEA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Revised Nov. 25, 2020), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2020-
determination-letters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-Meets-
Requirements (Part B); 2019, (Modified July 11, 2019), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2019-
determination-letters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-Meets-
Requirements; 2018, (July 24, 2018), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/idea-files/2018-determination-
letters-on-state-implementation-of-idea/#IDEA-Part-B-Determinations-Meets-Requirements; 
2017, (Revised July 12, 2017), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/ideafactsheet-determinations-
2017.pdf; 2016, (Revised July 10, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/ideafactsheet-
determinations-2016.pdf; 2015, (June 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/2015-
ideafactsheet-determinations.pdf; 2014, (revised April 2015) 
https://www2.ed.gov/fund/data/report/idea/finalrev0413152014ideafactsheet-determinations.pdf.  
 145.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020). 
 146.  2019–20 Student Discipline Data Report, MASS. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY EDUC., https://profiles.doe.mass.edu/statereport/ssdr.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).  
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SROs, or the standard for enforcement may impose too high a bar to 
hold SROs accountable for most instances of use of force. This section 
will first summarize several Massachusetts provisions, including (1) an 
SRO law and laws and regulations about discipline in schools,147 (2) 
constitutional and statutory civil rights provisions,148 and (3) the 
constitutional provision protecting against unreasonable search and 
seizure.149 Then, this section will evaluate whether the provisions are in 
lockstep with federal analogs or could provide additional remedies,150 
and consider limitations in raising claims under Massachusetts 
provisions. 
A.  Overview of Massachusetts Provisions 
1.  State limits on corporal punishment, physical restraints, and 
SROs in schools. 
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 71, § 37P (“the SRO Law”) 
requires at least one SRO per district, with limited exceptions.151 The 
SRO Law defines the SRO role152 and imposes some requirements and 
recommendations for SRO hiring and operations.153 Under this law, 
school superintendents and the police department providing the 
SRO(s) are required to enter into a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) that “clearly defin[es] the role and duties of the school 
resource officer.”154 The SRO Law requires that SRO hiring not be 
 
 147.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 37G 
(West 2020); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.00 (2016). 
 148.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV (barring disability discrimination); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 93 § 103 (West 2020) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020) 
(Massachusetts Civil Rights Act). 
 149.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV. 
 150.  This Note has not examined issues of claim preclusion and exhaustion under various 
Massachusetts frameworks. The analysis that follows is intended as an illustration of how a 
lockstepping framework may be useful, not as a complete canvassing of potential claims. 
 151.  The requirement was included in the Massachusetts Gun Violence Reduction Act, 2014 
Mass. Acts 284, which was passed in the aftermath of the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School. The act states, “[e]very chief of police, in consultation with the 
superintendent and subject to appropriation, shall assign at least 1 school resource officer to serve 
the city, town, commonwealth charter school, regional school district or county agricultural 
school.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(b). 
 152.  Massachusetts defines SRO as “a duly sworn municipal police officer with all necessary 
training, up-to-date certificates or a special officer appointed by the chief of police charged with 
providing law enforcement and security services to elementary and secondary public schools.” 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(a) (West 2020). 
 153.  See generally Rights Regarding School Resource Officers in Massachusetts, MENTAL 
HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMM. (February 2015), https://mhlac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/ed_school_resource_officers.pdf (describing the SRO law). 
 154.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37P(b), (e) (West 2020). The Massachusetts Attorney 
HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  6:44 PM 
2021] SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS 213 
based solely on seniority and requires the police chief to consider 
certain criteria such as personality, character, and specialized 
training.155 However, the SRO Law leaves police chiefs with 
considerable discretion in assigning SROs, stating that “the chief of 
police shall assign an officer that the chief believes would strive to foster 
an optimal learning environment and educational community.”156 
Under the SRO Law, MOUs must state that SROs cannot “serve as 
school disciplinarians, as enforcers of school regulations or in place of 
licensed school psychologists, psychiatrists or counselors and that 
SROs shall not use police powers to address traditional school 
discipline issues, including non-violent disruptive behavior.”157 The 
SRO Law also limits liability, stating that no public employer will be 
liable for actions or omissions “in the scope of the public employee’s 
employment and arising out of the implementation of” the SRO Law 
and that the SRO Law does not “creat[e] or impos[e] a specific duty of 
care.”158 
In the school setting, Massachusetts’s laws and regulations restrict 
use of force in the forms of corporal punishment,159 mechanical 
restraint, and physical restraint to “ensure that every student 
participating in a Massachusetts public education program is free from 
the use of physical restraint.”160 Use of restraints is regulated under 
Title 603, sections 46.00 through 46.06 of the Code of Massachusetts 
Regulations (“the Restraint Regulation”). The Restraint Regulation 
states that mechanical restraints and seclusion are “prohibited in public 
 
General’s office released a model MOU in 2018. Office of Attorney General Maura Healey, State 
Agencies Release Model Memorandum of Understanding for Massachusetts School Resource 
Officers, MASS.GOV (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/news/state-agencies-release-model-
memorandum-of-understanding-for-massachusetts-school-resource; Office of Attorney General 
Maura Healey, SRO MOU Final, MASS.GOV (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/doc/sro-mou-
final-9-5-18 [hereinafter Model MOU]. 
 155.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(e) (West 2020) 
 156.  See id. at § 37P(b) (emphasis added). The law continues, “The chief of police shall give 
preference to candidates who demonstrate the requisite personality and character to work with 
children and educators in a school environment and who have received specialized training 
relating to working with adolescents and children, including cognitive development, de-escalation 
techniques, and alternatives to arrest and diversion strategies.” Id. 
 157.  Id. The SRO Law requires that MOUs state the requirement in the accompanying text. 
The model MOU states, “Under state law, the SRO shall not serve as a school disciplinarian . . . 
.” Model MOU, supra note 154, at 6. The SRO law could be interpreted to imply that SROs are, 
in actuality, prohibited from such actions, or it could be read as simply requiring the statement in 
the MOU as an expression of policy preference. 
 158.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P(f) (West 2020). 
 159.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § 37G (West 2020). 
 160.  603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.01(2) (2016). 
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education programs.”161 School committees, teachers, employees, and 
agents of “the school committee,” are also restricted from using 
corporal punishment,162 and from using physical restraints unless 
performed by trained, qualifying personnel in “emergency situations, 
after . . . less intrusive alternatives have failed or been deemed 
inappropriate.”163 The Restraint Regulation requires program staff to 
review and consider disability-related factors specific to an individual 
student before employing physical restraints.164 Restraint is not to be 
used “[a]s a response to property destruction, disruption of school 
order, a student’s refusal to comply with a . . . rule or staff directive, or 
verbal threats when those actions that do not constitute a threat of 
assault, or imminent, serious, physical harm.”165 
The limits on corporal punishment do not, however, prohibit school 
personnel and their agents from “using such reasonable force as is 
necessary to protect pupils, other persons, and themselves from an 
assault by a pupil.”166 In addition, the Restraint Regulation does not 
 
 161.  Id. at 46.03(1)(a). Mechanical restraint is “the use of any physical device or equipment 
to restrict a student’s freedom of movement.” Id. at 46.02. Seclusion is “involuntary confinement 
of a student alone in a room or area from which the student is physically prevented from leaving.” 
Id.  
 162.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G(a) (West 2020) (“The power of the school 
committee or of any teacher or any other employee or agent of the school committee to maintain 
discipline upon school property shall not include the right to inflict corporal punishment upon 
any pupil.”). 
 163.  603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.01(3) (2016). Physical restraints are defined as “direct 
physical contact that prevents or significantly restricts a student’s freedom of movement.” Id. at 
46.02. The use of “prone” physical restraint is barred except under a few exceptions that all 
require advance documentation. Id. at 46.03(1)(b). Prone restraint is “a physical restraint in which 
a student is placed face down on the floor or another surface, and physical pressure is applied to 
the student’s body to keep the student in the face-down position.” Id. at 46.02. See generally Rights 
Regarding the Use of Restraint in Massachusetts Public Schools, MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL 
ADVISORS COMM. (January 2016), https://mhlac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/restraint_in_Mass_public_schools.pdf (summarizing Massachusetts 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education restraint regulations). 
 164.  See 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.05(5)(d) (2016) (requiring program staff to make certain 
safety considerations, including to “review and consider any known medical or psychological 
limitations . . . and/or behavioral intervention plans regarding the use of physical restraint on an 
individual student” and noting that “[n]othing in 603 CMR 46.00 shall be construed to limit the 
protection afforded publicly funded students under other state or federal laws, including those 
laws that provide for the rights of students who have been found eligible to receive special 
education services”). 
 165.  Id. at 46.03(2)(c). Further, the regulation provides that school personnel using physical 
restraints should have “two goals in mind:” to only use when necessary to protect “a student 
and/or a member of the school community from . . . imminent, serious, physical harm; and . . . to 
prevent or minimize any harm to the student as a result of the use of physical restraint.” Id. at 
46.01(3)(a–b). 
 166.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37G(b) (West 2020). 
HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  6:44 PM 
2021] SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS 215 
prohibit law enforcement or school security personnel “from exercising 
their responsibilities, including the physical detainment of a student or 
other person alleged to have committed a crime or posing a security 
risk.”167 It is unclear whether SROs are subject to the restrictions in the 
Restraint Regulation. However, a Massachusetts Department of 
Education guidance document states that “anyone employed by the 
school district and working in a school security role (e.g., school 
resource officer) should receive the in-depth training.”168 
2.  State limits on disability-based discrimination and the state Civil 
Rights Act. 
Article 114 of the Massachusetts Constitution, Section 103 of the 
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (MERA), and the Massachusetts Civil 
Rights Act (MCRA) are the primary state provisions that protect 
people from discrimination on the basis of disability. Article 114 and 
MERA § 103 both “exist to address the ‘pervasive unequal treatment 
of individuals with disabilities,’ who ‘have been faced with restrictions 
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, 
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society.’”169 
Unlike the U.S. Bill of Rights, Article 114 explicitly prohibits disability 
discrimination.170 It states that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination 
under any program or activity within the commonwealth.”171 The 
language of Article 114 is broad, and although it was modeled after 
Section 504, it applies to public and private entities and parties, even if 
they do not receive state or federal funds.172 Thus, Article 114 has a 
 
 167.  603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.03(4)(b) (2016). 
 168.  Questions & Answer Guide Related to Implementation of 603 CMR 46.00, MASS. DEP’T 
OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. (last updated September 3, 2020), 
https://www.doe.mass.edu/sfs/safety/restraint.html [hereinafter Mass. Questions & Answer 
Guide]. Similarly, it states elsewhere that “Any employee whose duties are primarily related to 
maintaining school safety (e.g., school resource officers) should be included in the in-depth 
training.” The guidance document also reiterates that “Nothing in 603 CMR 46.00 prohibits law 
enforcement, judicial authorities or school security personnel from exercising their 
responsibilities.” Id. 
 169.  Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Ct. Dep’t, 120 N.E.3d 297, 314 (Mass. 2019) (quoting 
In re McDonough, 930 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (2010)). 
 170.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 324 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Grubba v. Bay 
State Abrasives, Div. of Dresser Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 746, 747–48 (1st Cir. 1986)) (“By its plain 
language, the amendment does not limit the pool of potential defendants to public actors. . . .”); 
Heins, supra note 139, at 88 (Article 114 “reaches beyond the various handicap discrimination 
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broader scope than Section 504. 
A decade after ratifying Article 114, Massachusetts amended 
MERA173 to provide expressly for equal rights and reasonable 
accommodations for people with disabilities.174 MERA § 103 states in 
relevant part: 
Any person within the commonwealth, regardless of handicap or 
age . . . shall, with reasonable accommodation, have the same rights 
as other persons . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property, including, but 
not limited to, the rights secured under Article CXIV of the 
Amendments to the Constitution.175 
Section 103(c) specifies that courts should evaluate claims under 
the statute based on the “totality of the circumstances,” and provides a 
civil cause of action in Superior Court for injunctive and equitable 
relief, including compensatory and exemplary damages, and for 
attorney’s fees.176 
MCRA is the state’s equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.177 It provides a 
right of action when “any person or persons, whether or not acting 
under color of law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or 
attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the 
exercise or enjoyment” of another person’s rights.178 Liability “may be 
predicated upon violations of either the federal or state 
constitutions,”179 or upon violations of federal or state laws.180 The 
limited application of MCRA to interferences based on “threats, 
intimidation or coercion” is a higher standard for liability than what is 
required under § 1983.181 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
 
prohibitions in employment, housing and public accommodations that are now found in c. 151B 
and c.272.”); see also Disability Rights Laws in Massachusetts, MASS. OFF. ON DISABILITY, 
https://www.mass.gov/doc/disability-rights-laws-in-massachusetts/download (describing 
Massachusetts laws as of June 1, 2015) (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
 173.  See generally Heins, supra note 139, at 85–86 (describing the history of MERA). 
 174.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103 (West 2020). 
 175.  Id. Handicap is defined by reference to Title XXI Labor And Industries, Chapter 151B, 
§ 1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (2020) (“The term ‘handicap’ means (a) a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person; (b) a record 
of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment. . .”). 
 176.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103(c–d) (West 2020). 
 177.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020).  
 178.  Id. at § 11H (providing a right of action to the state Attorney General). Section 11I 
creates an individual right of action for the violations described in § 11H, and provides for 
injunctive and equitable relief, including compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at § 11I. 
 179.  Nuon v. City of Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.3 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 180.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020).  
 181.  Deptula v. City of Worcester, No. 17-40055-TSH, 2020 WL 1677633, at *7 (D. Mass. 
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has defined each term: A “threat” is the “intentional exertion of 
pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm”; 
“[i]ntimidation involves putting in fear for the purpose of compelling 
or deterring conduct;”182 and coercion involves “physical or moral” 
force applied to another to get them to act against their will and do 
something they “would not otherwise have done.”183 MCRA “affords 
the same standards of qualified immunity for public officials as that 
applicable under § 1983.”184 But unlike § 1983, MCRA applies to both 
public and private actors.185 
3.  State limits on unreasonable search and seizure. 
Article 14, Massachusetts’s correlate of the Fourth Amendment, 
protects the right for “[e]very subject . . . to be secure from all 
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his 
papers, and all his possessions.”186 The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has held that Article 14 provides more substantive 
protection than the Fourth Amendment in some areas, including a 
broader definition of “seizure.”187 In other areas, however, such as 
probable cause for arrest, Article 14 is in lockstep with the Fourth 
Amendment.188 There is little case law on Article 14 and seizures in the 
 
Apr. 6, 2020) (quoting Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 52 (Mass. 1989)).  
 182.  Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Mass. 1994) 
(cleaned up). 
 183.  Id. (quoting Coercion, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959)). 
 184.  Brown v. Butler, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-30030-MAP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572, 
at *42–43 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2017). See also, e.g., Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 
2010) (“Most importantly here, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that 
MCRA claims are subject to the same standard of immunity for police officers that is used for 
claims asserted under § 1983.”). 
 185.  See, e.g., Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Mass. 1985) 
(“[MCRA] extended beyond the limits of its Federal counterpart by incorporating private action 
within its bounds. . . . [T]he Legislature intended to provide a remedy under G.L. c. 12, § 11I, 
coextensive with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except that the Federal statute requires State action whereas 
its State counterpart does not.”). 
 186.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV. Ratified in 1780, Article 14 was a model for the crafting 
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161 (1947) (“The 
Fourth Amendment . . . derives from the similar provision in the first Massachusetts 
Constitution.”). 
 187.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyles, 905 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 n.1 (Mass. 2009) (“We have 
held that art. 14 provides more substantive protection than does the Fourth Amendment in 
defining the moment when an individual’s personal liberty has been significantly restrained by 
police such that the individual may be said to have been ‘seized’ within the meaning of art. 14.”). 
 188.  See, e.g., Brown, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572, at *38 n.10 (quoting Nuon v. City of 
Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The standard for probable cause for arrest 
under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights mirrors that of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 
1367 (Mass. 1992) (citing Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Mass. 1985)) 
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school setting,189 so it is difficult to determine the extent to which the 
more protective standard would extend to schools. The Supreme Court 
has held that the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is more limited in 
the school setting,190 but the standard for SROs—as opposed to non-
law-enforcement school officials—is far less clear. 
In Commonwealth v. Evelyn, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts stated that “[Article] 14 provides more substantive 
protection than does the Fourth Amendment in defining the moment 
of seizure.”191 Comparing seizure under the Fourth Amendment to 
seizure under Article 14, the court explained that the former occurs 
when a reasonable person believes they are not free to leave.192 Under 
the latter, “a seizure occurs when an officer, ‘through words or conduct, 
objectively communicate[s] that the officer would use his or her police 
power to coerce [an individual] to stay.’”193 Like the Fourth 
Amendment standard, the court applies an objective reasonableness 
standard under Article 14.194 And, as with the Fourth Amendment, age 
may be a relevant factor in the court’s Article 14 analysis of whether a 
seizure occurred and whether it was objectively reasonable.195 In 
Evelyn, the court held that 
[A] child’s age, when known to the officer or objectively apparent 
to a reasonable officer, is relevant to the question of seizure under 
 
(“Certainly, art. 14 imposes no higher standard than probable cause.”). 
 189.  This note will not analyze the application of Article 14 to searches. For a (dated) 
summary of case law on searches and seizures in schools, see Wendy Wolf & Perry Moriearty, 
School Search And Seizure: An Overview Of The Law, JUV. DEF. NETWORK, YOUTH ADVOC. 
DEP’T - COMM. FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVS. (2010), https://www.publiccounsel.net/ya/wp-
content/uploads/sites/6/2014/08/school-search-and-seizure.pdf. 
 190.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 
597 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Mass. 1992) (“It is consistent with the requirements of art. 14, except 
where a school employee is explicitly acting on behalf of law enforcement officials, for a school 
employee to conduct a search and seize drugs (guns and other contraband) in a school without 
first obtaining a search warrant.”). 
 191.  152 N.E.3d 108, 117 (Mass. 2020) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lyles, 905 
N.E.2d at 1107 n.1). 
 192.  Id. at 116 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)) (also citing 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)). 
 193.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Matta, 133 N.E.3d 258, 266 (Mass. 
2019)); but see Commonwealth v. Fraser, 573 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1991) (“[T]he police do not effect 
a seizure merely by asking questions unless the circumstances of the encounter are sufficiently 
intimidating that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to turn his back on his 
interrogator and walk away.”). 
 194.  Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d. at 120. (“We maintain an objective standard so that officers can 
‘determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment’ 
or art. 14.”). 
 195.  Id. at 118. (comparing the custody and arrest contexts and finding that age is relevant in 
each). 
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art. 14. The question will be whether the officer objectively 
communicated to a person of the juvenile’s apparent age that the 
officer would use his or her police power to coerce the juvenile to 
stay.196 
Article 14 claims generally arise under MCRA and, as described 
above, are subject to the same standard for qualified immunity as 
claims under § 1983.197 
B.  Application and comparison of Massachusetts laws 
While Massachusetts’s laws on discipline and corporal punishment 
are more protective that federal laws, the state’s disability 
discrimination provisions are largely in lockstep with federal laws. If an 
SRO in Massachusetts used excessive force against a disabled student, 
that student may be able to claim violations of her state constitutional 
right to be free from disability discrimination guaranteed by Article 114 
and MERA § 103. Protections under Article 14 may also offer 
additional protection beyond those of the Fourth Amendment, but 
there is little case law for evaluating the viability of an Article 14 claim 
raised under MCRA. 
Massachusetts law does exceed federal protections in its 
prohibition of mechanical restraints in schools, corporal punishment, 
and, except in limited circumstances, use of physical restraints.198 
Massachusetts’s SRO Law also exceeds federal protections by 
explicitly prohibiting SROs from using their police powers to address 
school discipline issues and non-violent disruptive behavior.199 But it is 
not clear that there is a sufficient state remedy when SROs violate these 
laws—in particular, the SRO Law or the Restraint Regulation—or if 
SROs will be held to the same standard as other school personnel. 
1.  Application of Massachusetts’s limits on corporal punishment, 
physical restraints, and SROs in schools as compared to federal limits. 
The SRO Law and the Restraints Regulation are more protective 
of students than federal law. While unlikely, it is possible they might 
support a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure 
or excessive force raised under § 1983. The state provisions could be 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 198.  See discussion supra Section III.A.1, note 161 (defining mechanical restraint), and note 
163 (defining physical restraint). 
 199.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020). 
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relevant to the qualified immunity analysis in a claim against an SRO 
for arrest without probable cause.200 However, there are limitations to 
these approaches. 
When evaluating use of force under the Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard, courts consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including factors like the school setting and the child’s 
age.201 In one case, for example, the school setting implied that “officers 
should exercise more restraint when dealing with student misbehavior 
in the school context.”202 Further, the court explained, the school setting 
“weighs against the reasonableness of using handcuffs.”203 Courts 
should consider the SRO Law, the Restraint Regulation, and the MOU 
between the school and the local law enforcement agency as key factors 
in analyzing  the reasonableness of a seizure. In addition to generally 
considering the school setting, courts should consider Massachusetts’s 
specific limits on SROs and protections for students. Failure to train 
SROs to understand Massachusetts’s restrictions arguably amounts to 
deliberate indifference given the high likelihood that the SRO would 
encounter situations where the provisions apply.204 
However, Massachusetts’s SRO Law and Restraint Regulation 
have limited application in Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983 
except where a plaintiff is raising a wrongful arrest or arrest without 
probable cause claim. This is because courts generally do not consider 
state laws when determining if the defendant’s conduct violated 
“clearly established law” for purposes of qualified immunity—courts’ 
analysis of whether law is clearly established relies on federal 
 
 200.  See, e.g., Nuon v. City of Lowell, 768 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333–34 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting 
that “unreasonable noise does not provide probable cause for the offense of disorderly conduct. 
Moreover, federal and Massachusetts case law clearly established that neither speech nor 
expressive conduct can properly form the basis of an arrest for disorderly conduct”).  
 201.  See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text (discussing objective reasonableness in 
the school setting). 
 202.  E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 183 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that it was 
unreasonable for an SRO to handcuff a “calm, compliant ten-year-old” who was on school 
grounds and sitting “in a closed office surrounded by three adults,” but concluding that the SRO 
was entitled to qualified immunity).  
 203.  Id. at 183–84 (“Society expects that children will make mistakes in school—and, yes, 
even occasionally fight. That teachers handle student misbehavior and unruliness ‘on a routine 
basis without the use of any force’ suggests that force is generally unnecessary in the school 
context.”). 
 204.  See, e.g., McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244, *14 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2019) (“Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the City has failed to train its 
police officers on appropriately interacting with juveniles who statistically, based on existing data 
and studies, may have a disability that would dictate how an officer — particularly a School 
Resource Officer — should interact with such a juvenile.”). 
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constitutional precedents. State provisions may be relevant in some 
cases, however, such as claims of wrongful arrest and arrest without 
probable cause where the claim depends on the validity of the arrest, 
i.e., whether the officer reasonably believed the arrestee violated or 
was about to violate state or federal law.205 In Wilber v. Curtis, for 
example, the plaintiff brought a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 
for arrest without probable cause.206 The court evaluated probable 
cause in relation to the offenses that the officer believed the plaintiff 
was committing, explaining that the plaintiff “must show that it was 
clear under state law that there was not probable cause to arrest him for 
this crime.”207 
Take also a case involving an SRO in Kentucky. At the time, the 
state’s regulations on corporal punishment, restraint, and discipline by 
SROs were similar to Massachusetts’s.208 Two elementary school 
children, S.R. and L.G., sued the county sheriff and the SRO after the 
SRO handcuffed them each behind their backs at the biceps.209 The 
SRO handcuffed S.R., an eight-year-old child who weighed 54-pounds, 
because he swung his arm at the SRO.210 The SRO handcuffed L.G. on 
multiple occasions, including after the 56-pound nine-year old hit and 
blew snot at the SRO, and after she hit, kicked, and scratched a staff 
member.211 The court described, but did not resolve, the question of 
whether the SRO’s actions were done while in the role of school 
personnel or in the role of law enforcement. If he were deemed to be 
school personnel, his repeated handcuffing of students would violate a 
 
 205.  See, e.g., Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Probable cause exists when the 
arresting officer, acting upon apparently trustworthy information, reasonably concludes that a 
crime has been (or is about to be) committed and that the putative arrestee likely is one of the 
perpetrators.”); Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (affirming the magistrate’s finding 
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because state law did not clearly establish 
that the officers did not have probable cause). 
 206.  872 F.3d at 19. 
 207.  Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (“[F]or purposes of qualified immunity, it is not enough to 
show that the officers may have made a mistaken determination about whether Wilber’s conduct 
provided probable cause to conclude that he had committed the offense for which he was 
arrested.”). 
 208.  S.R. v. Kenton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 302 F. Supp. 3d 821, 825–26 (E.D. Ky. 2017) 
(describing that the contract between the county board of education and the sheriff’s department 
prohibited SROs from disciplining students; a state regulation prohibited use of restraints 
(including handcuffs) in most situations, including as punishment or discipline, but provided that 
the regulation “does not prohibit the lawful exercise of law enforcement duties by sworn law 
enforcement officers”). 
 209.  Id. at 829–30. 
 210.  Id. at 827. 
 211.  Id. at 828–30. The SRO did not bring criminal charges against S.R. or L.G., testifying 
that “none of what they did was worthy of trying to file a criminal charge.” Id. at 830. 
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state regulatory bar on use of mechanical restraints, but if he were 
deemed law enforcement, it might be permitted under the exception 
for “lawful exercise of law enforcement duties.”212 The court denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, determining that the 
seizures and use of force were unreasonable as a matter of law and that 
the municipality was liable—regardless of the applicability of the 
Kentucky regulation.213 In short, the court avoided determining the 
applicability of the state’s regulation to the SRO to reach a liability 
determination.214 
In a case where an SRO’s actions were particularly severe, a court 
might be able to avoid the question of the applicability of 
Massachusetts’s regulations, as in S.R. But if a court did reach the issue, 
it might conclude that the SRO was not acting in a school personnel 
capacity and that the Restraint Regulation only applies to school 
personnel, that the SRO Law or Restraint Regulation do not apply to 
the behavior the SRO was responding to, or that the SRO Law is non-
binding because it explicitly limits liability for public employers and 
does not impose a specific duty of care. 
2.  Application of Massachusetts’s Civil Rights Act and Article 14 
as compared to § 1983. 
On the one hand, MCRA imposes a high threshold for illegal 
conduct by requiring threats, intimidation, or coercion,215 making it 
unlikely that a plaintiff could successfully use MCRA to pursue a claim 
against an SRO. On the other hand, Massachusetts’s broader definition 
of seizure under Article 14 may bar more conduct than the Fourth 
Amendment alone. Massachusetts also follows a lockstep application 
of qualified immunity under § 1983.216 Use of force or seizure by law 
enforcement “is not, in itself, coercive under the MCRA unless the 
 
 212.  Id. at 832–33 (“Because SROs wear two hats while serving in Kentucky schools, it can 
be difficult to discern when their actions constitute those of school personnel or those of law 
enforcement. Moreover, the existence of a regulation prohibiting allegedly unconstitutional 
conduct is but one factor in the Graham analysis.”). 
 213.  Id. at 833. 
 214.  Id. (“[T]he Court need not determine the applicability of 704 KAR 7:160 § 3(2)(a) 
because [the SRO’s] seizure and use of force, under the facts of this case, were unreasonable, even 
in the absence of the above regulation.”). 
 215.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (West 2020) (providing a right of action 
when “any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interfere by threats, 
intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the 
exercise or enjoyment” of another person’s rights). For an overview of MCRA, see notes 177–185 
and accompanying text supra.  
 216.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
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force is inflicted to achieve ‘some further purpose.’”217 Though there is 
some disagreement on whether a Fourth Amendment violation alone 
can give rise to a MCRA claim, most courts have found that it does 
not.218 Similarly, a violation of Article 14 alone may be insufficient to 
state a claim under MCRA absent threats, intimidation, or coercion. 
But if an SRO made statements suggesting a purpose of punishing or 
disciplining a student for behavior that stemmed from a disability, a 
plaintiff may be able to bring a claim under MCRA for violating any of 
the state or federal constitutional and statutory rights described 
above.219 
Cases with SROs in other jurisdictions have involved motives 
suggestive of threats, intimidation, or coercion as defined by MCRA. 
For example, in Gray v. Bostic, a case against an SRO in Georgia, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that “[e]very reasonable officer would have 
known that handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for purely 
punitive purposes is unreasonable.”220 The court found that the seizure 
“was justified at its inception” because the nine-year-old committed a 
misdemeanor by threatening her teacher.221 However, the court held 
that the SRO’s actions were not responding to an exigent threat, and 
instead were intended to teach the student a lesson.222 Therefore, the 
seizure was not “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified interference in the first place.”223 The court in Gray then 
concluded that the SRO was not entitled to qualified immunity.224 
Likewise, Massachusetts’s broader definition of what constitutes an 
unreasonable seizure under Article 14 may allow students to challenge 
a greater range of SRO conduct than under the Fourth Amendment 
alone.225 Age can be a relevant factor when a court considers whether 
 
 217.  Walker v. Jackson, 56 F. Supp. 3d 89, 95 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting Gallagher v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2002 WL 924243, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 11, 2002)). 
 218.  Brown v. Butler, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-30030-MAP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219572, 
at *41, n. 12 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2017). 
 219.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H (West 2020) (providing a right of action for 
violations of “rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured 
by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth”). 
 220.  Gray v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (applying the 
standard from New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42, (1985)). 
 221.  Id. at 1304 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341). 
 222.  Id. at 1304–05 (“[T]he handcuffing was excessively intrusive given Gray’s young age and 
the fact that it was not done to protect anyone’s safety.”). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 1306–07 (applying the “obvious clarity” standard, described supra note 67). 
 225.  See generally Section III.A.3, supra (describing Article 14, Massachusetts’s search and 
seizure provision). 
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a seizure occurred and whether it was objectively reasonable under the 
totality of the circumstances.226 The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts explained that “the naiveté, immaturity, and 
vulnerability of a child will imbue the objective communications of a 
police officer with greater coercive power.”227 Indeed, a student’s age is 
likely to impact her own perception of when an SRO has committed a 
seizure and “‘engaged in some show of authority’ that a reasonable 
person would consider coercive.”228 So if the standard for establishing 
that a seizure occurred is lower, it may thus be easier to establish that 
an SRO’s seizure of a student violated Article 14. But proving that an 
unconstitutional seizure alone occurred is insufficient to establish 
liability under MCRA—the student would also have to demonstrate 
that the seizure involved threats, intimidation, or coercion.229 
In addition, courts should consider the SRO Law and Restraint 
Regulation in evaluating a MCRA claim for excessive force or arrest 
without probable cause in violation of Article 14.230 First, these state 
laws show that the school setting and the attendant policy decisions are 
relevant to the totality of circumstances inquiry. The legislature and the 
Massachusetts Department of Education, respectively, made policy 
judgments to restrict SRO authority and conduct under the SRO Law 
and to broadly limit the use of restraints under the Restraint 
Regulation. The state also recommended that SROs receive the same 
training that school personnel authorized to administer restraints are 
required to attend, albeit in a non-binding policy document.231 In any 
event, these binding and non-binding policies evince the legislature’s 
judgment that more should be done to keep students safe. 
Second, a court should conclude that the state provisions limit the 
scope of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity under MCRA mirrors 
the standard under § 1983, so any MCRA analysis should look to state 
statutes and precedents for identifying clearly established law.232 The 
 
 226.  Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 152 N.E.3d 108, 118 (Mass. 2020) (finding that age can be a 
relevant factor when determining whether a seizure occurred). 
 227.  Id. (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011)). 
 228.  Commonwealth v. Matta, 133 N.E.3d 258, 266 (Mass. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sanchez, 531 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Mass. 1988)). 
 229.  See notes 217–219 and accompanying text supra. 
 230.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIV. See Section III.A, supra (describing the SRO Law and 
Restraint Regulation). 
 231.  Mass. Questions & Answer Guide, supra note 168. 
 232.  See, e.g., Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Mass. 1989) (finding that “the law of 
this State was not clearly established” such that it would indicate that the policy in question 
violated Article 14). 
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Restraint Regulation explicitly prohibits mechanical restraint in public 
education programs,233 and the SRO Law234 prohibits SROs from using 
police powers for traditional school discipline.235 The SRO Law also 
requires training for SROs, and the Massachusetts Department of 
Education recommends that SROs receive training on the Restraint 
Regulation as well.236 Taken together, these policies should qualify as 
“clearly established law,” and seizures employing banned methods 
would clearly contravene such laws. But as with a Fourth Amendment 
claim, a court may find that the Restraint Regulation does not apply 
because the SRO was not acting in a school personnel capacity; that the 
student’s behavior exempted the SRO from the SRO Law or Restraint 
Regulation; or that the restrictions are non-binding. 
3.  Application of Massachusetts’s disability discrimination 
provisions as compared to federal provisions. 
Massachusetts’s state disability discrimination provisions do not 
clearly provide significant additional remedies or recourse beyond 
what the ADA and Section 504 provide. Both Article 114237 and MERA 
§ 103,238 which bar disability discrimination, have mostly been 
interpreted in lockstep with the ADA and Section 504.239 In particular, 
Article 114 mirrors the language of Section 504, and bars exclusion, 
denial of benefits, or discrimination “solely by reason of” disability.240 
 
 233.  603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.00 (2016). 
 234.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37P (West 2020). 
 235.  See supra Section III.A.1 (describing the Restraint Regulation and the SRO Law).  
 236.  Mass. Questions & Answer Guide, supra note 168. 
 237.  MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV. 
 238.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 103 (West 2020). 
 239.  For example, as with the ADA and Section 504, exclusion from benefits does not need 
to be “complete” to qualify as discrimination under Art. 114. See, e.g., Shedlock v. Dep’t Of 
Correction, 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1033 (Mass. 2004) (“The fact that Shedlock was not totally excluded 
from his cell or from prison programs does not make it impossible for him to prove his claim 
under the ADA, [Section 504], and art. 114. . .”). In Shedlock, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that it was overly narrow to require that “a violation could only be premised 
on conduct that resulted in a complete exclusion from programs or total denial of benefits.” Id. 
Similarly, the court held that, “[a]lthough art. 114 contains no definition of the term ‘qualified 
handicapped individual,’ the language of the amendment closely tracks the language of the 
[Rehabilitation Act].” Id. at 1031 (citing Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., 546 N.E.2d 
166, 168 n.4 (Mass. 1989)). 
 240.  Compare MASS. CONST. amend. art. CXIV (“No otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, denied 
the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity within the 
commonwealth.” (emphasis added)) with 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (stating that an individual with 
disabilities cannot, “solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or . . . conducted by any Executive agency.” (emphasis 
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It is possible that, under Article 114, a plaintiff is not required to prove 
that the defendant subjectively intended to discriminate.241 There is 
little case law arising under Article 114 and MERA § 103 outside the 
employment setting, so it is unclear how a court would treat Article 114 
and MERA claims against an SRO. But this also means that a court 
could interpret the Massachusetts provisions—and especially Article 
114—as imposing requirements above the floor required by the ADA 
and Section 504 in the school context. 
Massachusetts’s disability provisions do not significantly augment 
the protections from federal law, but a plaintiff could use state law to 
raise claims that mirror common federal claims. A plaintiff could claim 
that the SRO, the school district, and the law enforcement agency failed 
to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability in the use of force, failed to 
adequately train SROs on interacting with students with disabilities, 
and discriminated against disabled students in the methods of 
administering the SRO program.242 As described in Section II.A.2, most 
circuits require police to provide reasonable accommodations during 
arrest absent exigent circumstances. In Wilson v. City of Southlake, for 
example, the court found that the SRO was not exempt from 
accommodating an eight-year-old in the course of arrest.243 In 
determining that the circumstances were not so exigent as to make 
accommodations unreasonable, the court considered: (1) the school 
setting and the actions of bystanders, (2) the relative threat in light of 
the child’s age, (3) the officer’s knowledge of the child’s disability, and 
(4) the presence and type of weapon.244 
The claim would likely need to be brought under MERA § 103, not 
Article 114. Courts have held that Article 114 does not provide an 
independent cause of action where a claim is available under an 
 
added)). 
 241.  Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 546 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Mass. 1989) 
(stating in dicta that “[t]here is no requirement in art. 114 that a defendant be shown to have 
subjectively intended to deny the constitutional rights of a handicapped individual”). 
 242.  See generally Section II.A.2, supra, describing the federal disability law claims in 
McCadden v. City of Flint, No. 18-12377, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63244 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2019). 
 243.  936 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 244.  See id. at 331–32. In Wilson, a school staff member had instructed the officer to remain 
where he was and not speak to the child while the staff member tried to diffuse the situation, 
indicating a lack of exigence. The child’s age reflected that the relative threat was low, and the 
officer knew of the child’s disability. The court concluded that the child did not have an actual 
weapon capable of inflicting harm, stating that “[a] jump rope in the hands of an eight-year-old 
child is not a weapon.” Id. 
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existing statute such as MCRA245 or MERA.246 In Brodsky v. New 
England School of Law, the District of Massachusetts held that an 
expelled law student could not proceed directly against the law school 
under Article 114 on allegations of disability discrimination.247 The 
court explained that the constitutional claim was indistinguishable 
from the claim brought under MERA § 103, and MERA provided a 
“well-worn procedural path to relief.”248 
There are at least two more potential obstacles to bringing a claim 
under Art. 114 or MERA § 103. First, a government authority could 
have qualified immunity, but in Shedlock v. Department of Corrections, 
the court noted that the Department of Corrections did not argue that 
it was immune from suit for violations of Article 114.249 Second, some 
courts have interpreted Section 504 to require a different causation 
standard than the ADA:250 Section 504 prohibits discrimination “solely 
by reason of” disability,251 whereas the ADA does not require that the 
discrimination is “solely” based on disability status.252 Other courts 
 
 245.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11I (West 2020); see, e.g., Kilburn v. Dep’t of Corr. 
State Transp. Unit, No. 07-P-812, 2008 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 396 (App. Ct. July 25, 2008) 
(“There is no individual right of action under art. 114 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
where, as here, a plaintiff may seek redress under an existing statute such as G.L. c. 12, § 11I, of 
the State Civil Rights Act.”); Layne, 546 N.E.2d at 168 (“If a violation of art. 114 rights can be 
redressed within the ambit of an existing statute, such as the State Civil Rights Act, there is a well-
worn procedural path to relief for such a violation.”). 
 246.  See, e.g., Marlon v. W. New Eng. Coll., No. CIV.A. 01-12199DPW, 2003 WL 22914304, 
at *10 n.19 (D. Mass. Dec. 9, 2003), aff’d, 124 F. App’x 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that student-
plaintiff could not “separately bring both an Article 114 claim and a § 103 claim” against the 
college for failure to accommodate her disabilities); Brodsky v. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 617 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D. Mass. 2009) (same). The federal district court in Marlon explained of 
Massachusetts’ state precedent: “The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that ‘[i]f 
a violation of art. 114 rights can be redressed within the ambit of an existing statute, such as the 
State Civil Rights Act, there is a well-worn procedural path to relief for such a violation.’” Marlon, 
2003 WL 22914304 at *10 n.19 (first quoting Layne, 546 N.E.2d at 168; then citing Tate v. Dep’t 
of Mental Health, 645 N.E.2d 1159 (Mass. 1995) (Article 114 claim barred because a claim under 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B provided adequate relief to redress handicap discrimination in 
employment). 
 247.  Brodsky, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 6. 
 248.  Id. at 6. 
 249.  Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1038 n.14 (Mass. 2004) (“While the 
immunity theories might extend to the entirety of Shedlock’s ADA claims (a point we need not 
decide), any such immunity would be of no practical consequence in light of Shedlock’s 
companion claims under [Section 504] and art. 114. . . . [T]he department [has not] contended that 
it is immune from suit for violations of art. 114.”). 
 250.  See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Southlake, 936 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) 
(“Under Section 504, the plaintiff must establish that disability discrimination was the sole reason 
for the exclusion or denial of benefits. While under Title II of the ADA, ‘discrimination need not 
be the sole reason.’”). 
 251.  29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 252.  42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
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have made no such distinction. For example, in Shedlock, the court 
stated that, “[t]he ADA, the [Rehabilitation Act], and art. 114 all 
prohibit the same conduct.”253 The court’s statement in Shedlock 
suggests that Massachusetts courts may be hesitant to apply “solely” as 
a more demanding standard. 
IV.  LOCKSTEPPING AND EVOLVING ADVOCACY, LITIGATION, AND 
POLICY STRATEGIES 
In the current landscape, plaintiffs face daunting odds if they look 
to the courts for recourse for SRO misconduct, but litigation against 
SROs has continued nonetheless.254 The trend can likely be attributed 
to SROs’ “entrenched behavioral patterns.”255 Though some states have 
implemented policies intended to restrict SRO conduct, it is not clear 
that such policies offer more actionable protection than federal law. 
Despite Massachusetts’s efforts—including the SRO Law and its MOU 
requirement, and the Restraint Regulation and its associated training 
recommendations—it is not clear there are remedies for 
noncompliance. Similarly, even if state provisions like Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Constitution prove to be more protective than federal 
law, qualified immunity and confused law stemming from SROs’ 
blurred roles may limit students’ recourse. 
Thus, federal law and some state law appear to be insufficient to 
deter inappropriate use of force by SROs. Absent meaningful remedies 
and prevention, eliminating SROs from schools altogether seems like 
the only option. This section will briefly consider future directions and 
priorities for protecting students from SROs through litigation and 
policy reform, and the potential for state and local governments to 
break out of lockstep to adopt standards that are more protective than 
federal law. 
Many advocates are pushing for state and local policy reform to 
eliminate SROs from schools altogether.256 Some are lobbying to 
 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, 
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). 
 253.  Shedlock, 818 N.E.2d at 1032. 
 254.  Zirkel, supra note 11, at 323 
 255.  Id. (“[T]he primary contributing factor [to unabated SRO litigation] appears to be the 
seemingly entrenched behavioral pattern of the SROs reflected in these cases,” not an increase 
in the number of SROs because the number of SROs has not significantly increased in recent 
years). 
 256.  Zoom Interview with Sabrina Bernadel, Attorney, Equal Justice Works Fellow, Nat’l 
Women’s L. Ctr., (Dec. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Bernadel Interview] (interview notes on file with 
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reallocate SRO funds in state and local budgets to school counseling 
and mental health resources.257 Others are working to increase SRO 
accountability by limiting the reach of qualified immunity as a 
defense.258 And some organizations are strategizing to avoid “failure to 
train” claims that ultimately require greater allocation of resources to 
law enforcement, which would be counterproductive to the ultimate 
goal of reducing the presence of SROs.259 Indeed, data shows that 
providing additional resources and training to law enforcement has not 
reduced negative interactions between law enforcement and either 
people of color or disabled people.260 
Because state and local governments have primary authority over 
education, education funding,261 and law enforcement, it is both 
possible and appropriate for them to break out of lockstep—especially 
 
the Author). See, e.g., Perez Jr. & Erwin, supra note 141 (“In response to national protests against 
racism and police brutality sparked by the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, several school 
districts across the country have ended their relationships with local police departments.”). 
 257.  See, e.g., Cheryl Corley, Do Police Officers in Schools Really Make Them Safer?, NPR 
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591753884/do-police-officers-in-schools-really-
make-them-safer (“[Activists] with Voices of Youth in Chicago Education . . . are lobbying for 
changes that would allow school districts to use some money designated for school resource 
officers for school psychologists, social workers and other strategies.”). 
 258.  See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, P.3d 128, 140 (Mont. 2002) (rejecting qualified immunity 
as a defense for state constitutional claims). See also Nick Sibilla, Colorado Passes Landmark Law 
Against Qualified Immunity, Creates New Way to Protect Civil Rights, FORBES (Jun 21, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/06/21/colorado-passes-landmark-law-against-
qualified-immunity-creates-new-way-to-protect-civil-rights/?sh=2982df23378a (describing a 
movement to change immunity doctrines across the U.S., including Colorado enacting legislation 
in June 2020 to eliminate qualified immunity for local law enforcement officers, sheriff’s deputies, 
and Colorado State Patrol officers in actions under state law in state court). 
 259.  Cf. Alex S. Vitale, The Answer to Police Violence Is Not ‘Reform’. It’s Defunding. Here’s 
Why, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/31/the-answer-to-police-violence-is-not-
reform-its-defunding-heres-why (“The alternative is not more money for police training 
programs, hardware or oversight. It is to dramatically shrink their function.”); Caroline Preston, 
Police Education Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed?, HECHINGER REP. (June 28, 2020), 
https://hechingerreport.org/police-education-is-broken-can-it-be-fixed/ (“You can have the best 
training in the world but at the end of the day it comes down to morals, it comes down to the 
culture of an organization, it comes down to what’s tolerated,” said Erik Misselt, the interim 
executive director of the Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training (cleaned up)). 
 260.  See generally Martin Kaste, NYPD Study: Implicit Bias Training Changes Minds, Not 
Necessarily Behavior, NPR (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/10/909380525/nypd-
study-implicit-bias-training-changes-minds-not-necessarily-behavior (describing a study with a 
“null result” that “doesn’t prove implicit bias training changes cops’ behavior, but it doesn’t 
disprove it either”). 
 261.  To varying degrees over the years, schooling has primarily been the domain of states. 
Wong, supra note 135 (“Schooling in America is not the domain of the federal government, but 
rather the domain of states, all 50 of which mandate in their individual constitutions the provision 
of public education.”); see also Zackin, supra note 129, at 67. 
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in the absence of comprehensive federal action. Attorney Peggy 
Nicholson’s experience in North Carolina need not be the norm: She 
explained that “lax” state laws usually did not offer viable options for 
claims related to use of force in schools by SROs or by other personnel, 
leaving her to rely on federal law.262 Crystal Grant, an education law 
attorney who practiced in Michigan, explained that she has had success 
filing administrative complaints against congregate living centers based 
on violations of the state’s policy prohibiting the use of restraints as 
punishment.263 Grant would usually use the state’s administrative 
complaint process or mediation because “going to court does not end 
well.”264 
Breaking out of lockstep could potentially be effective in a 
litigation strategy that capitalizes on state public education provisions. 
As described in Section II.B, many state constitutions guarantee a 
“positive right” to a free, public education and impose equitable 
funding and resource allocation obligations. Positive rights “require 
government to do or provide something, while negative rights require 
only that government refrain from doing something.”265 Suits alleging 
violations of the positive right to education generally claim that a state 
has failed to provide equal access to education or an education that 
meets a qualitative minimum standard—both of which are obligations 
under the state constitution.266 
 
 262.  Zoom Interview with Crystal Grant and Peggy Nicholson, Attorneys, Duke University 
School of Law Children’s Law Clinic (Dec. 16, 2020) (interview notes on file with the Author). 
For clarity, Grant’s statements will be reference hereinafter as “Grant Interview,” and 
Nicholson’s statements as “Nicholson Interview.” Grant is a Senior Lecturing Fellow & Interim 
Director of the Children’s Law Clinic and was previously a clinical fellow in the Pediatric 
Advocacy Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School and practiced education and disability 
law in Michigan. Nicholson is a Lecturing Fellow & Supervising Attorney at the Children’s Law 
Clinic and was previously the director of the Youth Justice Project of the Southern Coalition for 
Social Justice and an education-law attorney at Legal Aid of North Carolina. 
 263.  Grant Interview, supra note 262 (describing a general strategy not specific to SROs). 
Congregate living centers can include group homes for disabled individuals and long-term care 
facilities. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Zackin, supra note 129, at 27 (“Negative rights are the bases of demands for restraint by 
the government, while positive rights are the bases of demands for intervention. . . . [I]t is useful 
to think about the difference between a right to housing and a right to free speech. A right that 
requires government to intervene by providing the homeless with shelter is a positive right, while 
a right that requires government to refrain from silencing speech is a negative right.”). 
 266.  See, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 252 (Mass. 2018) (denying a challenge to 
the state’s caps on charter school enrollment by students arguing that they were denied a 
constitutionally adequate education and dismissing the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under 
the state constitution, but noting that the state constitution’s education clause imposes “an 
affirmative duty on the Commonwealth to provide . . . constitutionally ‘adequate’” education in 
public schools). 
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Such suits have not yet been used in the SRO context. Arguably, 
“unreasonable, forceful, or life-threatening interactions with SROs” 
may interfere with the fundamental right to education under the state 
constitution because it deprives the child of valuable learning time and 
inhibits positive development at school.267 A plaintiff would need to 
show a connection between the allocation of resources and the failure 
to provide an education that meets the state’s constitutional floor.268 
Plaintiffs might demonstrate, for example, that SROs are not in fact 
making schools and students safer and that resources are being 
allocated to SROs and security personnel instead of to other critical 
areas.269 Other critical areas where resources may be necessary for 
students to achieve a qualitative minimum of education might include 
funding for teachers, mental health personnel, or books or facilities.270 
SROs impose severe costs for school districts and states, including for 
funding of positions and the “fiscal and public relations costs of using . 
. . districts’ limited education budgets to defend [SRO] court actions.”271 
The fiscal costs are difficult to estimate, but in 2018, 26 states allocated 
at least $960 million for school safety programs.272 One report found 
that police officers “assigned to the Chicago Public Schools 
accumulated over $2 million in misconduct settlements” from 2012-
 
 267.  See generally Sabrina Bernadel, Simply Put, Education is Different, Analyzing the Gary 
B. v Whitmer Right to A Basic Minimum Education as a Constitutional Claim Against School 
Resource Officers, at 43, (May 12, 2020) (working paper) (on file with the Author) (considering 
“the viability of and strategies for bringing claims against states for violation of students’ 
constitutional right to a basic minimum education to limit, if not eliminate, the presence of 
SROs”).  
 268.  Right to education claims are focused on the allocation of resources. Zackin, supra note 
129, and Sutton, supra note 122, provide thorough accounts of the evolution of right to education 
claims. Many state constitutional provisions arose out of severe inequities in education funding, 
and activists pushing for reform used litigation to advance a movement for education equity. See 
supra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (describing right to education claims). In connecting 
SRO presence to state education resources, advocates would need to examine the types of data 
that courts in that jurisdiction consider. See, e.g., M. Patrick Moore Jr., The Constitutional Right 
to Education in the Commonwealth, 101 MASS. L. REV. 19, 27 (2020) (“Following Doe, students 
from a diverse and economically disadvantaged district may use the state’s own data to allege that 
the education they are being provided is inadequate.”). 
 269.  Bernadel Interview, supra note 256. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Zirkel, supra note 11, at 326. “For the public relations cost, consider the impact of media 
reports of SROs ‘body slamming a 12-year-old girl,’ carrying ‘powerful rifles,’ ‘handcuffing a 
crying 7-year-old,’ ‘repeatedly pinn[ing] to ground, [and] handcuff[ing]’ a 10-year-old boy with 
autism, and arresting students for ‘such minor infractions as . . . trying to get to the bathroom.’” 
Id. at 326–27 (quoting various news articles) (citations omitted). “[G]iven the budgetary 
constraints of school districts and other SRO employers, the priority in resource allocation must 
extend beyond the prevailing prescription for training.” Id. at 331. 
 272.  Phenicie, supra note 26 (“Colorado lawmakers, for instance, poured $35 million into 
school resource officers and security upgrades.”). 
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2016.273 
But litigation is not currently the primary focus for at least some 
advocacy organizations. T.W., a former attorney who worked on issues 
related to the school-to-prison pipeline at a national litigation and 
advocacy non-profit organization, explained that advocates have 
thought about new and different claims to bring, but ultimately, the 
larger focus has shifted to policy-based arguments.274 He explained that 
“everybody wants to litigate, but it just isn’t feasible because the case 
law is so bad.”275 Without broader change, T.W. explained, students 
obtain relief from abusive SRO conduct only when there is attention 
from the media and shocking videos—not from the range of cumulative 
harm that happens off-camera.276 The status quo is the systematic 
criminalization of the innocuous behavior of older students—
especially students of color—which does not usually make the news or 
get addressed in court.277 
Training for SROs278 and clarifying and limiting SROs’ roles 
through the use of MOUs are frequently recommended areas for 
reform and are recurring issues in SRO-related litigation.279 But some 
advocates are changing tack: Particularly in the wake of nationwide 
racial justice protests in 2020, many advocacy organizations are 
reevaluating how best to address these issues.280 Some advocates are 
 
 273.  Michelle Mbekeani-Wiley, Handcuffs in Hallways: The State of Policing in Chicago 
Public Schools, SHRIVER CTR. ON POVERTY L. at 4, (Feb. 1, 2017) 
https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/handcuffs-in-hallways-amended-
rev1.pdf (updated in part June 30, 2020).  
 274.  Zoom Interview with T.W., former attorney at a national litigation and advocacy non-
profit organization, (Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter T.W. Interview] (interview notes on file with the 
Author). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Grant described one of her cases where a student was tased by an SRO, and the SRO 
was unfamiliar with Behavioral Intervention Plans (BIPs), which are positive behavioral supports 
for disabled students that the school district must consider under the IDEA. Implementing a BIP 
is best practice to regulate responses to undesirable disability-related behaviors. Grant negotiated 
a settlement that required that SROs be included in trainings about interacting with disabled 
students. Grant Interview, supra note 262. 
 279.  See, e.g., Shaver & Decker, supra note 21, at 282 (“These cases reveal the need for a 
comprehensive training program for SROs, clear delineation of the scope of-and limitations on-
the SROs’ duties, and strict adherence by both school personnel and the SROs to their respective 
roles.”); OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 33, at 1 (requiring MOUs 
that “clearly define[] the roles and responsibilities of the individual partners involved”). 
 280.  Bernadel Interview, supra note 256. For example, on June 30, 2020, the Shriver Center 
on Poverty Law published a cover letter on its February 2017 report on police in schools, stating, 
“While we know that many groups have relied on the data in our report to make the case for 
#policefreeschools we also know that the data and our recommendations resulted in solutions, 
HAAG_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  6:44 PM 
2021] SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS & DISABILITY RIGHTS 233 
finding that requiring MOUs between law enforcement and schools 
and requiring better training for SROs have not had as much positive 
impact as hoped: Students are still experiencing broad, negative effects 
from SRO presence in schools.281 T.W. criticized the effectiveness of 
relying on MOUs and merely categorizing SROs as school personnel 
to limit SRO misconduct.282 The former, he explained, are mere non-
binding policy documents and consequently do not provide a right of 
action. The latter will usually not matter much because SROs still have 
police power from the state “at the end of the day” and courts are 
unlikely to use the more restrictive standards that apply to school 
personnel.283 
State and local independence are also essential to achieving current 
policy aims. Many activists and advocacy organizations are working to 
shift resources from programs that “invest in criminalization” to 
programs that improve school climates and student well-being.284 In 
Chicago, for example, “students, the city’s teachers union and 
community groups are now circulating a petition and calling for the $33 
million the school system spends placing police in schools to be used 
instead to hire additional nurses and counselors.”285 Local legislative 
and budgetary control are essential to building on local activism and 
community support.286 Grant and T.W. emphasized the importance of 
using narratives—which must include the voices of students with 
disabilities287—to shift public attitudes and build community support.288 
Achieving narrative shifts is a marathon and takes time, but it is 
important to be ready for impactful “advocacy windows” that will arise 
during the marathon.289 In addition, Nicholson explained that broader 
change to address the presence of law enforcement in schools requires 
the use of cross-cutting strategies that take advantage of the combined 
 
which we advocated for, that historically have not always produced desirable outcomes. Going 
forward, we are committed to always listening to the voices of people directly impacted by laws 
and policies.” See Mbekeani-Wiley, supra note 273.  
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 285.  Lauren Camera, The End of Police in Schools, U.S. NEWS (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2020-06-12/schools-districts-end-contracts-
with-police-amid-ongoing-protests. 
 286.  T.W. Interview, supra note 274. 
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 289.  Zoom Interview with S.S., policy analyst at a regional litigation and advocacy non-profit 
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expertise of education law practitioners (who usually bring suits against 
schools) and civil rights practitioners (who usually bring suits against 
law enforcement).290 
SROs impose great individual and societal costs,291 and there is a 
paucity of evidence that SROs are effective in preventing mass 
shootings or provide other significant benefits. “Established to prevent 
violence, primarily from outside the school, SROs have produced 
violence inside the schools.”292 The presence of SROs results in students 
achieving less and experiencing more physical and emotional harm, 
with long-term implications for individuals and communities.293 
CONCLUSION 
With more emphasis by many advocates on state and local solutions 
to the problems associated with SROs, future litigation will likely 
involve more claims related to state and local laws. Arguments around 
the benefits of breaking out of lockstep can be raised in support of 
“liberal” or “conservative” policies, as Judge Sutton points out.294 In any 
event, advocates, state and local legislators, and courts should avoid 
reflexive lockstepping and take advantage of the broader latitude 
offered by state constitutions and state and local law to address the 
quintessentially local issues of education and law enforcement. 
Increasing recognition of the harms that stem from having SROs in 
schools and invigorated movements to shift resources from SROs to 
other resources provide an opportunity for state and local legislators to 
promote school safety in ways that are more protective of all students. 
Advocates, including those who generally litigate exclusively in federal 
 
 290.  Nicholson Interview, supra note 262. Nicholson explained that the best options in her 
practice were usually to file a grievance at the school level or a complaint with the U.S. 
Department of Education, or to raise issues through the processes outlined in the IDEA based 
on a denial of FAPE. 
 291.  Weisburst describes a conservative estimate of the aggregate policy cost that results 
from the impact of SROs on educational attainment generally, and on graduation rates 
specifically. Weisburst, supra note 3, at 362. “The resulting loss in earnings is $105 million dollars 
for affected students, leading to an aggregate policy cost of $162 million including the value of 
grant transfers. This calculation is illustrative: It does not include emotional or psychological costs 
of school discipline, the value of increased safety or perceptions of safety, benefits for subgroups 
of students who may be positively affected, costs of more than a single year decrease in schooling, 
or costs related to reductions in college enrollment. Despite these limitations, this exercise 
highlights the fact that the results in this study raise serious questions about the value of future 
investments in school police.” 
 292.  Zirkel, supra note 11, at 332. 
 293.  See Section I.B, supra.  
 294.  See Sutton, supra note 122, at 176–77 (“[S]tate constitutions provid[ing] a second avenue 
for invalidating a local law says nothing about what kind of law should be, or will be, challenged.”). 
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courts, must be prepared to make the case for broader protections in 
state courts. 
 
